

PWWSD REPORT · SEPTEMBER 2026

Gendered Impacts of Israel's Settlement Regime in the West Bank

Settler Violence, Movement Restrictions, Socioeconomic Harm and Restrictions on Women's Civic Space, 2022–2026

Submitted to: Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women; the Special Rapporteur on violence against women and girls; and relevant United Nations agencies and human-rights mechanisms

Submitted by: Palestinian Working Woman Society for Development (PWWSD)

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Palestinian Working Woman Society for Development (PWWSD)

DATE

September 2026

SCOPE

The occupied West Bank, including East Jerusalem, 2022–2026, with particular attention to developments since 7 October 2023. The Gaza Strip falls outside the scope of this report.

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Testimonies reproduced in Chapter II are drawn from published research by the West Bank Protection Consortium and preserve the anonymisation applied at source. Readers are advised that Chapter II contains accounts of sexual and gender-based violence.

CONTENTS

Contents



Glossary of Terms	4
Key Figures at a Glance	6
Executive Summary	7
Scope and argument	7
The settlement regime.....	7
Lethal and sexual violence.....	8
Movement restrictions.....	9
Gendered socioeconomic harm	9
Restrictions on women-led civil society	10
Legal implications	10
Priority actions.....	11
Introduction	12
Methodology.....	15
I Settlement Expansion, Settler Violence and Movement Restrictions	17
Settlement expansion and land confiscation	18
Settler violence	21
Pastoral and agricultural outposts	23
Movement restrictions: checkpoints, closures and the Barrier.....	26
II Gendered Consequences for Palestinian Women and Girls.....	29
Gender-based and sexual violence	30
Displacement and loss of safety	32
Economic marginalisation and rural livelihoods	35
Reproductive and maternal healthcare	37
Education	41
Mental health and unpaid care	43
Public and civic participation	44
III Restrictions on Women's Organisations, Defenders and Accountability	46
Targeting and delegitimisation of Palestinian civil society	47
Funding and registration restrictions	49

Effects on women's rights organisations and service delivery	52
Surveillance, detention and harassment of women human-rights defenders	52
Digital censorship, advocacy and documentation.....	54

IV Consolidated Legal Findings56

Findings of the International Court of Justice.....	57
Applicable rules of international humanitarian law	59
Applicable rules of international human rights law	60
Characterisations under international criminal law.....	61
State responsibility and reparation	62

Conclusion..... 63

Recommendations65

To the Palestinian Authority	66
To third States, in particular States parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention and the Rome Statute	67
To United Nations agencies and mechanisms	69

Annex 1: The 37 International Organisations Notified of Deregistration 71

Annex 2: Documented Restrictions on Palestinian Content by Digital Platforms74

Bibliography.....76

REFERENCE

Glossary of Terms



Abbreviation	Meaning
CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
COI	Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and Israel
CRC	Convention on the Rights of the Child
CRSV	Conflict-related sexual violence
CWRC	Colonization and Wall Resistance Commission (State of Palestine)
DEVAW	Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women (1993)
Dunam	A unit of land area equal to 1,000 square metres (0.1 hectare); 1,000 dunams equal one square kilometre
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
GBV	Gender-based violence
GC IV	Geneva Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 12 August 1949
HU	Housing units
HWC	Health Work Committees
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICCPR	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ICERD	International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
ICESCR	International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
ICJ	International Court of Justice
IHL	International humanitarian law
IHRL	International human rights law
INGO	International non-governmental organisation
IOP	Israeli Occupying Power
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

Abbreviation	Meaning
OHCHR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
OPT	Occupied Palestinian territory
PRCS	Palestine Red Crescent Society
SRH	Sexual and reproductive health
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council resolution
UPWC	Union of Palestinian Women's Committees
WBPC	West Bank Protection Consortium
WHO	World Health Organization
WHRD	Woman human-rights defender
WPS	Women, Peace and Security

OVERVIEW

Key Figures at a Glance



The settlement regime, settler violence, movement controls and the suppression of civic space are components of a single system. These figures, drawn from the sources cited in this report, show how its harms fall on Palestinian women and girls.

LAND AND SETTLEMENT

780,000

settlers in 192 settlements and 400 outposts

CWRC, July 2026

54

new settlements approved in 2025 — a record

EU settlement report, 2026

14%

of the West Bank taken through pastoral outposts (786,000 dunams)

Kerem Navot & Peace Now

VIOLENCE AND MOVEMENT

25

Palestinians killed by settlers, Jan–Aug 2026 — highest on record

CWRC, Aug 2026

925

movement obstacles — 43% above the 20-year average

OCHA, Dec 2025

5,910

people forcibly displaced from 117 herding communities

OCHA, Jan 2023 – Apr 2026

WOMEN AND GIRLS

70%+

of displaced households named threats to women and children as the decisive reason for leaving

WBPC, Apr 2026

87%

of forcibly transferred women lost all sources of income

WBPC, Apr 2026

16

documented cases of conflict-related sexual violence in Area C

WBPC, Apr 2026 · under-reported

42%

of West Bank health facilities fully operational

UNFPA, Feb 2026

230,000+

women and girls with limited or no reproductive-health access

UNFPA / OCHA, 2026

6,557

girls in schools under demolition or stop-work orders

Education Cluster, Oct 2025

CIVIC SPACE

6

organisations, including the Union of Palestinian Women's Committees, designated "terrorist" since 2021

37

international organisations notified of deregistration, 30 Dec 2025

3,452

digital-rights violations against Palestinians documented in 2025

7amleh

OVERVIEW

Executive Summary



Scope and argument

This report documents the gendered consequences of Israel's settlement regime in the occupied West Bank, including East Jerusalem, over the period 2022–2026. It does not address the Gaza Strip, where the conduct of the Israeli Occupying Power (IOP) and the applicable factual questions differ materially.

Its central argument is that settlement expansion, settler violence, territorial and movement controls, and the suppression of civic space are not separate phenomena. They are mutually reinforcing components of a single regime, and they produce distinct and compounding harms for Palestinian women and girls. Restrictions on women-led civil society form part of that harm: they disable the institutions through which Palestinian women obtain protection and services, through which violations are documented, and through which survivors reach remedies and international accountability mechanisms.

The settlement regime

In 2025 the Israeli government approved the establishment of 54 new settlements in the West Bank excluding East Jerusalem — the highest number recorded in a single year — while settlers erected 86 new outposts, 58 of them agricultural or pastoral. Across the OPT, 63,311 housing units were advanced through planning in 2025, the highest annual total ever recorded, although these plans have not yet been implemented.¹ As of the end of July 2026, the Colonization and Wall Resistance Commission (CWRC) recorded approximately 780,000 settlers in the West Bank including East Jerusalem, distributed across 192 settlements and 400 outposts, 231 of them pastoral; official Israeli orders extend control over 42 per cent of the West Bank, 71 per cent of Area C and up to 91 per cent of the Jordan Valley.²

¹ Office of the European Union Representative (West Bank and Gaza Strip, UNRWA), *2025 Report on Israeli Settlements in the Occupied West Bank, including East Jerusalem*, reporting period January–December 2025, published 17 July 2026, Summary and section 3 (E1). <https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2026/documents/2025%20Report%20on%20Israeli%20settlements%20in%20the%20occupied%20West%20Bank.pdf>

² Colonization and Wall Resistance Commission (State of Palestine), settlement indicators to the end of July 2026, reported August 2026. <https://www.cwrc.ps/page-4871-ar.html>



The Annexation Wall cutting through the West Bank, with a ladder propped against it. Photo: © PWWSO.

Pastoral outposts are now the principal instrument of rural dispossession. Peace Now and Kerem Navot calculate that settlers operating shepherding outposts have taken control of at least 786,000 dunams — 14 per cent of the West Bank, an area larger than all conventional settlements combined.³ Between January 2023 and 30 April 2026, OCHA recorded the forced displacement of at least 5,910 Palestinians from 117 predominantly Bedouin and herding communities in Area C as a result of settler violence and related access restrictions; at least 45 of those communities were emptied entirely.⁴

Lethal and sexual violence

The CWRC recorded 25 Palestinians killed in settler attacks between 1 January and 21 August 2026 — the highest annual toll since it began systematic documentation in 2019, and 79 per cent above the total for all of 2025. Of the 87 killings recorded since 2019, 61 occurred after 7 October 2023 and 12 of the victims were children.⁵ The International Court of Justice found in 2024 that Israel's systematic failure to prevent or punish settler attacks on the life and bodily integrity of Palestinians is inconsistent with its obligations.⁶

In April 2026 the West Bank Protection Consortium published research documenting at least 16 cases of conflict-related sexual violence attributed to Israeli settlers and soldiers in Area C, alongside a wider pattern of sexualised harassment, indecent exposure, threats of rape, intrusive surveillance of bedrooms and degrading searches reaching into homes and courtyards. More than 70 per cent of dis-

³ Kerem Navot and Peace Now, *The Bad Samaritan: Land Grabbing by Settlers Through Grazing*, joint report, April 2025, Part One (land seized through shepherding outposts: 786,000 dunams; classification of land taken). <https://peacenow.org.il/en/the-bad-samaritan-land-grabbing-by-settlers-through-grazing>

⁴ Amnesty International, *Israel's Ethnic Cleansing of West Bank Bedouin and Herding Communities*, research report, 10 June 2026, sections "Settler violence as state policy" and "Conclusions and recommendations". <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/research/2026/06/israel-west-bank-ethnic-cleansing/>

⁵ Colonization and Wall Resistance Commission (State of Palestine), statistical statement on Palestinians killed in settler attacks, 21 August 2026 (87 killed 1 January 2019 – 21 August 2026; 25 killed in 2026; 61 since 7 October 2023; 12 children; governorate and age distribution). <https://www.cwrc.ps/page-4879-en.html>

⁶ International Court of Justice, *Legal Consequences arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem*, Advisory Opinion, 19 July 2024, paras. 148–154. <https://www.icj-cij.org/case/186>

placed households interviewed identified threats to women and children, particularly sexualised violence, as the decisive reason for leaving.⁷ In January 2026 OHCHR stated that the forcible transfer of Palestinians within occupied territory constitutes a war crime and may amount to a crime against humanity.⁸

Movement restrictions

As of December 2025, OCHA documented 925 movement obstacles permanently or intermittently restricting the movement of 3.4 million Palestinians — 43 per cent above the twenty-year annual average of 647. Checkpoints and road gates now make up nearly 60 per cent of obstacles; at least 20 per cent of closures block access to agricultural land. The Barrier, 712 kilometres long and running 85 per cent inside the West Bank, remains the single largest obstacle, and the majority of the 62 agricultural gates through it are closed year-round.⁹ The International Court of Justice held in 2004 that the Barrier's route within the OPT and its associated régime are contrary to international law.¹⁰

Gendered socioeconomic harm

Among households that experienced forcible transfer, 87 per cent of women reported losing all sources of income — dairy production, embroidery, foraging and beekeeping — and 90 per cent reported increased psychological stress and trauma; 92 per cent of households lost access to grazing and agricultural land and 40 per cent of affected children lost access to education.¹¹ In January 2026 OCHA reported that more than 72,000 farming and herding families required urgent agricultural assistance.¹²

UNFPA reported in February 2026 that only 42 per cent of health facilities in the West Bank were fully operational and that roadblocks, checkpoints, curfews and insecurity routinely delayed or prevented pregnant women from reaching essential services.¹³ Across the West Bank, more than 230,000 women and girls — among them some 14,800 pregnant women — have limited or no access to reproductive health services.¹⁴ Between January and July 2026 WHO recorded 98 attacks affecting health care in the West Bank, causing 33 injuries and four deaths and affecting 83 health transport vehicles and 11 health facilities.¹⁵

⁷ Nicola Banks and Busaina Nazzal, *Sexual Violence and Forcible Transfer in the West Bank: How the Exploitation of Gender Dynamics Drives Displacement*, West Bank Protection Consortium (led by the Norwegian Refugee Council), April 2026, Executive Summary, p. 4. <https://www.nrc.no/globalassets/pdf/reports/sexual-violence-and-forcible-transfer-in-the-west-bank/sexual-violence-and-forcible-transfer-in-the-west-bank---final.pdf>

⁸ Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, press release, "Settler violence drives forced displacement in the West Bank", 29 January 2026. <https://palestine.un.org/en/node/309094>

⁹ United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), *Movement and Access in the West Bank*, Fact Sheet, 23 April 2026, "Key facts and figures" (data as of December 2025). <https://www.ochaopt.org/content/movement-and-access-west-bank-april-2026>

¹⁰ International Court of Justice, *Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory*, Advisory Opinion, 9 July 2004, I.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 136. <https://www.icj-cij.org/case/131>

¹¹ Banks and Nazzal, *Sexual Violence and Forcible Transfer in the West Bank*, April 2026, "Key Findings", p. 5.

¹² OCHA, *Humanitarian Situation Update #354 | West Bank*, 22 January 2026. <https://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanitarian-situation-update-354-west-bank>

¹³ United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), "West Bank: How movement restrictions threaten motherhood — and why UNFPA's support is vital", 1 February 2026. <https://arabstates.unfpa.org/en/news/west-bank-how-movement-restrictions-threaten-motherhood%E2%80%94and-why-unfpa-support-vital>

¹⁴ UNFPA, "A safe space on wheels reaches women in remote West Bank communities", 19 September 2025 (over 230,000 women and girls with limited or no access to reproductive health services, among them some 14,800 pregnant women). <https://www.un.org/unispal/?p=311486>

¹⁵ OCHA, *Humanitarian Situation Report | 14 August 2026*, West Bank section (WHO data on attacks affecting health care, January–July 2026; settler attacks in Beit Furik, Beit Dajan, Deir Sharaf and Beitillu; PRCs and ambulance incidents). <https://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanitarian-situation-report-14-august-2026>

Families under sustained coercion adopt gendered coping strategies: restricting women's movement, relocating women and children separately, and arranging early marriages. Researchers recorded at least six families who married daughters aged 15 to 17 in order to move them out of high-risk communities.¹⁶

Restrictions on women-led civil society

Six Palestinian organisations, including the Union of Palestinian Women's Committees (UPWC), have been designated "terrorist organisations" by Israel since 19 October 2021 on the basis of material that Israeli authorities have refused to disclose to the organisations or their lawyers.¹⁷ The UPWC's president, Khitam Saafin, was imprisoned and released in May 2022 on condition that she not resume her human-rights work.¹⁸ On 4 September 2025 the United States designated Al-Haq, Al-Mezan and the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights under an executive order directed at the International Criminal Court, freezing assets within US jurisdiction; UN experts described the measure as a direct attack on international justice.¹⁹ On 30 December 2025, 37 international humanitarian organisations – many of them the principal providers of sexual and reproductive health, gender-based violence and protection services in the OPT – were notified that their registrations had expired.²⁰ Women human-rights defenders continue to face night raids, incommunicado detention, administrative detention and prosecution for online expression.²¹

Legal implications

The evidence assembled here engages, at a minimum: the prohibition on transferring an occupying power's civilian population into occupied territory (Article 49(6) GC IV; Article 8(2)(b)(viii) of the Rome Statute); the prohibition of forcible transfer of protected persons (Article 49(1) GC IV); the duty to protect women against rape and any form of indecent assault (Article 27(2) GC IV); the due-diligence obligation to prevent, investigate and punish violence against women (DEVAW Article 4(c); CEDAW General Recommendation No. 35); and the rights to freedom of association and to participate in public life (Articles 21–22 ICCPR; CEDAW Articles 7–8). Where the requisite contextual and evidentiary thresholds are met, conduct documented in this report may also engage Articles 7(1)(g), 7(1)(h) and 8(2)(b)(xxii) of the Rome Statute. PWWSO does not assert that these thresholds have been judicially established; it asks the competent mechanisms to determine them.

¹⁶ Banks and Nazzari, *Sexual Violence and Forcible Transfer in the West Bank*, April 2026, "Early Marriage Under Displacement Pressure", pp. 14–15.

¹⁷ Adalah – The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel, press release, "Israel refuses to reveal the evidence against the six Palestinian organizations it has designated as 'terrorist organizations'", 6 January 2022. <https://www.adalah.org/en/content/view/10515>

¹⁸ Front Line Defenders, case update, "Woman human rights defender Khitam Saafin released after 18 months of imprisonment on condition of not continuing her human rights work", 3 June 2022. <https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/en/case/woman-human-rights-defender-khitam-saafin-released-after-18-months-imprisonment-condition-not>

¹⁹ OHCHR, press release, "UN experts dismayed by US sanctions against Palestinian human rights organisations", 22 September 2025. <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/09/un-experts-dismayed-us-sanctions-against-palestinian-human-rights>

²⁰ Joint statement of 53 international non-governmental organisations, "Israel's recent registration measures will impede critical humanitarian action", January 2026. <https://www.nrc.no/news/2026/53-international-ngos-warn-israels-recent-registration-measures-will-impede-critical-humanitarian-action>

²¹ Addameer Prisoner Support and Human Rights Association, "Military Court Extends Detention of Dr. Dima Amin Until Tomorrow, Tuesday", 24 August 2026 (arrest of 18 August 2026; conditions of detention at the Moscobiyah centre; extension of 20 August 2026). <https://addameer.ps/news/5708>

In its Advisory Opinion of 19 July 2024 the International Court of Justice found Israel's continued presence in the OPT unlawful and held that Israel must bring it to an end as rapidly as possible, cease all new settlement activity, evacuate all settlers and make reparation; and that all States are under an obligation not to recognise as legal the situation arising from that unlawful presence and not to render aid or assistance in maintaining it.²²

Priority actions

The Palestinian Authority should adopt a costed, updated National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security with dedicated provision for rural, Bedouin and herding women; expand free legal aid and survivor-centred psychosocial services for women affected by settler and occupation-related violence; establish a protection mechanism for women human-rights defenders; and ensure that domestic registration and counter-terrorism practice does not replicate the restrictions documented in Chapter III.

Third States are under legal obligations of non-recognition and non-assistance, and, as parties to the Geneva Conventions, to ensure respect for GC IV. PWWSO recommends that they give effect to those obligations by suspending arms transfers where there is a clear risk of contribution to serious violations, applying differentiated treatment to settlement-linked goods and entities, reviewing public procurement and investment guarantees, providing direct and flexible funding to Palestinian women's rights organisations, and cooperating fully with the ICC.

United Nations agencies and mechanisms should systematise sex-disaggregated reporting against the obligations identified in the 2004 and 2024 Advisory Opinions; ensure that any future register of damage or reparations mechanism accepts gender-disaggregated claims, including for lost informal and unpaid livelihoods; resource UNFPA and UN Women programming on GBV prevention and reproductive-health continuity for rural and Bedouin women; and expand monitoring of the targeting of women-led organisations, funding restrictions and digital-rights violations.

²² International Court of Justice, *Legal Consequences arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem*, Advisory Opinion, 19 July 2024, paras. 267–283 and operative para. 285. <https://www.icj-cij.org/case/186>

CONTEXT

Introduction



Since October 2023 the occupied West Bank, including East Jerusalem, has been marked by an intensifying and mutually reinforcing pattern of violations spanning territorial control, restrictions on movement, and a narrowing of civic space for Palestinian civil society. Palestinian women and girls bear a disproportionate share of the resulting harm — as direct targets of violence, as the primary caregivers and informal economic actors who absorb the consequences of dispossession, and as the leadership of a civil-society sector under sustained attack.




A young man raises the Palestinian flag on a hilltop opposite an Israeli settlement in the West Bank. Photo: © PWWS.

The Colonization and Wall Resistance Commission (CWRC) describes the first half of 2026 as a qualitative transformation in the mechanisms of the Israeli settlement project, marked by an unprecedented acceleration in legislation and government decisions, structural planning, outpost construction and land confiscation.²³ As of the end of July 2026 approximately 780,000 Israeli settlers reside in the West Bank including East Jerusalem, across 192 settlements and 400 outposts, 231 of them pastoral; official Israeli orders extend control over 42 per cent of the West Bank, 71 per cent of Area C and up to 91 per cent of the Jordan Valley.²⁴ Settler violence has reached record levels, and the great majority of incidents result in no prosecution.

²³ Colonization and Wall Resistance Commission (State of Palestine), report on the declaration of 1,152 dunams belonging to Sinjil, Al-Lubban ash-Sharqiya and Qaryut as “state land” to expand the Karmei Oz settlement, 19 August 2026 (also reporting cumulative “state land” declarations and the assessment of the first half of 2026). <https://www.cwrc.ps/page-4871-ar.html>

²⁴ Colonization and Wall Resistance Commission (State of Palestine), settlement indicators to the end of July 2026, reported August 2026. <https://www.cwrc.ps/page-4871-ar.html>

FIGURE 1
The settlement regime at the end of July 2026

SHARE OF TERRITORY UNDER OFFICIAL ISRAELI ORDERS


Source: Colonization and Wall Resistance Commission (CWRC), settlement indicators to the end of July 2026.

This territorial control is reinforced by an expansive obstruction régime. As of December 2025 OCHA documented 925 movement obstacles restricting the movement of 3.4 million Palestinians across the West Bank, including East Jerusalem — 89 checkpoints staffed continuously, 218 partial checkpoints, 232 road gates, 114 linear closures, 167 earthmounds and 105 roadblocks — alongside the 712-kilometre Barrier, 85 per cent of whose route runs inside the West Bank rather than along the Green Line.²⁵ These obstacles constrain women's and girls' access to healthcare, education, agricultural land, markets and public life; at least one-fifth of documented closures block access to agricultural land.

The narrowing of civic space is part of the same picture rather than a separate subject. Six Palestinian civil-society organisations, including the Union of Palestinian Women's Committees, have been designated "terrorist organisations" by Israel since 2021 on the basis of undisclosed material, and women human-rights defenders continue to face arrest, surveillance and prosecution for their advocacy. OHCHR defines civic space as the environment that enables civil society to play a role in the political, economic and social life of societies, including the ability to access information, engage in dialogue and participate in decisions, online and offline.²⁶ In the OPT, civic space is where Palestinian women's organisations deliver protection and health services, document violations and pursue accountability, and where women exercise the political-participation rights guaranteed by CEDAW Articles 7 and 8 and recognised in UN Security Council resolutions 1325 (2000) and 2122 (2013).²⁷ Closing that space does not merely restrict speech: it removes the institutions through which the violations documented in this report would otherwise be recorded, remedied and challenged.

The report situates its findings within international humanitarian law, international human rights law and international criminal law. Article 49(6) GC IV prohibits an occupying power from deporting or transferring parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies.²⁸ Article 55 of the

²⁵ United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), *Movement and Access in the West Bank*, Fact Sheet, 23 April 2026, "Key facts and figures" (data as of December 2025). <https://www.ochaopt.org/content/movement-and-access-west-bank-april-2026>

²⁶ OHCHR, "Civic Space and Human Rights Defenders" (topic page). <https://www.ohchr.org/en/topic/civic-space-and-human-rights-defenders>

²⁷ United Nations Security Council, resolution 2122 (2013), S/RES/2122 (18 October 2013). <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/759604>

²⁸ Geneva Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 12 August 1949, Arts. 16, 17, 27, 29, 33, 47, 49, 50, 53, 55, 56, 64, 71–76 and 147. <https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/gciv-1949>

1907 Hague Regulations confines the occupant to the position of administrator and usufructuary of public property and requires it to safeguard the capital of that property.²⁹ The International Court of Justice's Advisory Opinion of 9 July 2004 found the construction of the Barrier in the OPT and its associated régime contrary to international law,³⁰ and its Advisory Opinion of 19 July 2024 found Israel's continued presence in the OPT unlawful and reaffirmed that the settlements and the régime associated with them have been established and are being maintained in violation of international law.³¹ These findings intersect with the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Article 8(2)(b) (viii) of which lists the transfer by an occupying power of parts of its own civilian population into occupied territory among the war crimes applicable in international armed conflict;³² and with the IC-CPR, the ICESCR and CEDAW, read together with CEDAW General Recommendation No. 30 on women in conflict prevention, conflict and post-conflict situations.³³

²⁹ Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, The Hague, 18 October 1907, Arts. 23(g), 43, 46, 52 and 55. <https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/hague-conv-iv-1907>

³⁰ International Court of Justice, *Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory*, Advisory Opinion, 9 July 2004, I.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 136. <https://www.icj-cij.org/case/131>

³¹ International Court of Justice, *Legal Consequences arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem*, Advisory Opinion, 19 July 2024, paras. 111–156. <https://www.icj-cij.org/case/186>

³² Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, Arts. 7(1)(d), 7(1)(g), 7(1)(h), 8(2)(a)(vii), 8(2)(b)(viii), 8(2)(b)(xxii) and 8(2)(e)(vi). <https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/2024-05/Rome-Statute-eng.pdf>

³³ Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, General Recommendation No. 30 on women in conflict prevention, conflict and post-conflict situations, CEDAW/C/GC/30, 1 November 2013. <https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/general-comments-and-recommendations/general-recommendation-no-30-women-conflict>

APPROACH

Methodology



Geographic and temporal scope. This report covers the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, for the period 2022–2026, with particular attention to developments since 7 October 2023. The Gaza Strip falls outside its scope. Where sources cover the OPT as a whole, this is stated.

Types of source used. The report draws on five categories of material, which it distinguishes throughout:

- 1. Judicial and treaty sources** — the Advisory Opinions of the International Court of Justice, the Rome Statute, the Geneva Conventions and the Hague Regulations, and the core human-rights treaties and their general recommendations, cited to primary texts.
- 2. United Nations documentation** — OCHA situation reports and fact sheets, OHCHR press releases and reports, findings of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry, and UNFPA, WHO, UNICEF and Education Cluster reporting.
- 3. Palestinian official documentation** — principally the statistical series and analyses of the Colonization and Wall Resistance Commission, a body of the State of Palestine with a specific mandate to monitor settlement activity.
- 4. Palestinian, Israeli and international civil-society documentation** — including Al-Haq, Adalah, Addameer, Al-Baidar Organization for the Defense of Bedouin Rights, 7amleh, Peace Now and Kerem Navot, the West Bank Protection Consortium, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch.
- 5. PWWSO's own analysis** — the gender analysis that connects documented facts to their differentiated consequences for women and girls. Passages that represent PWWSO's assessment rather than a cited finding are identified as such.

PWWSO works within Palestinian civil-society networks, including the Palestinian NGO Network, and receives field documentation, case information and testimonies through partner organisations, coalitions and grassroots groups. Where documentation originates from a partner or network source, that origin is identified.

Testimonies. The individual accounts reproduced in Chapter II are drawn from the West Bank Protection Consortium's April 2026 research on sexual violence and forcible transfer, which was conducted through 83 in-depth interviews (44 women and 39 men), 12 focus group discussions across 10 Palestinian communities in the Jordan Valley, the South Hebron Hills and the central West Bank, and 26 key-informant interviews. The consortium reports that all interviews were conducted with informed consent, that identifying details were withheld to mitigate the risk of retaliation, and that findings were triangulated across interviews, focus groups, documentary evidence and datasets.³⁴

³⁴ Banks and Nazzari, *Sexual Violence and Forcible Transfer in the West Bank*, April 2026, "Research Methods & Sources", p. 6.

This report reproduces those accounts without alteration and preserves the anonymisation applied at source. It distinguishes between direct participant quotations and incidents described in the consortium's own narrative.

Sex-disaggregation and the basis of the gender analysis. Much of the available quantitative data on settlement expansion, movement obstacles, demolitions and casualties is not sex-disaggregated. Where a source provides sex-disaggregated figures, this report says so. Where it does not, the report states the limitation and explains the basis on which a gendered consequence is inferred — typically the documented division of labour in rural and Bedouin communities, the documented location of incidents in domestic space, or findings from sources that do disaggregate. Analytical inferences of this kind are not presented as measured findings.

Limitations. This report does not claim to be statistically representative of the West Bank as a whole. Under-reporting of sexual and gender-based violence is severe: protection practitioners and women-led organisations working in the West Bank consistently describe stigma, conservative social norms, insecurity, the power imbalance of occupation and fear of retaliation as deterrents to disclosure.³⁵ The figures below should therefore be read as minimums.

³⁵ Banks and Nazzari, *Sexual Violence and Forcible Transfer in the West Bank*, April 2026, "Conflict-Related Sexual Violence", p. 8.



Masked settlers advance on a woman in an olive grove in the West Bank. Photo: © PWWSO.

Settlement Expansion, Settler Violence and Movement Restrictions

This chapter establishes the Israeli policies and practices whose gendered consequences are analysed in Chapter II. It addresses settlement expansion and land confiscation; settler violence, including killings and sexual violence; the pastoral-outpost model of rural dispossession; and the movement-obstacle régime.

IN THIS CHAPTER

- 01** Settlement expansion and land confiscation
- 02** Settler violence
- 03** Pastoral and agricultural outposts
- 04** Movement restrictions: checkpoints, closures and the Barrier



Settlement expansion and land confiscation

The IOP no longer treats settlement activity solely as an instrument for expanding control over Palestinian land. It has made settlement a governing framework for politically, legally and administratively restructuring Palestinian territory, consolidating annexation and rendering it difficult to reverse. According to the CWRC, the first half of 2026 marked a qualitative shift in the mechanisms of that project, reflected in an acceleration of legislation and government decisions placing settlements at the centre of Israeli public policy, and in a significant increase in structural plans, new outposts, land confiscation, the redrawing of settlement boundaries, the creation of buffer zones and the issuance of demolition orders. These measures have been accompanied by an intensification of organised settler violence against Palestinians and their property.³⁶

On 19 August 2026 the IOP declared approximately 1,152 dunams belonging to the towns of Sinjil, Al-Lubban ash-Sharqiya and Qaryut to be “state land”. The CWRC assesses that the seizure is intended to expand the Karmeil Oz settlement and to strengthen territorial contiguity between settlements and outposts north of Ramallah and south of Nablus.³⁷ The CWRC records that more than 28,000 dunams of Palestinian-owned land have been declared “state land” over the past three years, with the majority — more than 24,000 dunams — declared in 2024. It assesses that “state land” declarations have become a central policy instrument for reallocating Palestinian land to settlements, creating contiguity between them and imposing de facto annexation. The designation places land under the control of the Israeli Custodian of Government Property, opening the way for its inclusion in planning zones and for road and infrastructure construction.³⁸

³⁶ Colonization and Wall Resistance Commission (State of Palestine), report on the declaration of 1,152 dunams belonging to Sinjil, Al-Lubban ash-Sharqiya and Qaryut as “state land” to expand the Karmeil Oz settlement, 19 August 2026 (also reporting cumulative “state land” declarations and the assessment of the first half of 2026). <https://www.cwrc.ps/page-4871-ar.html>

³⁷ Colonization and Wall Resistance Commission (State of Palestine), report on the declaration of 1,152 dunams belonging to Sinjil, Al-Lubban ash-Sharqiya and Qaryut as “state land” to expand the Karmeil Oz settlement, 19 August 2026 (also reporting cumulative “state land” declarations and the assessment of the first half of 2026). <https://www.cwrc.ps/page-4871-ar.html>


³⁸ Colonization and Wall Resistance Commission (State of Palestine), report on the declaration of 1,152 dunams belonging to Sinjil, Al-Lubban ash-Sharqiya and Qaryut as “state land” to expand the Karmeil Oz settlement, 19 August 2026 (also reporting cumulative “state land” declarations and the assessment of the first half of 2026). <https://www.cwrc.ps/page-4871-ar.html>



An Israeli military post and settlement caravans on a hilltop above Palestinian homes and farmland. **Photo: © PWWSO.**

In 2025 this acceleration reached record levels. The European Union's annual settlement report records that the Israeli government approved the establishment of 54 new settlements in the West Bank excluding East Jerusalem — the highest figure ever recorded in a single year — while 86 new outposts were erected at an average rate of one to two per week, 58 of them agricultural or pastoral. In parallel, 27,941 housing units were advanced for submission or final authorisation by the Higher Planning Council for West Bank settlements excluding East Jerusalem, and a further record 35,370 units across 56 plans were advanced in occupied East Jerusalem, nearly double the 2024 figure of 18,988. Taken together, 63,311 housing units were advanced through planning across the OPT in 2025, the highest annual total ever recorded. The EU notes that these plans have not yet been implemented.³⁹

³⁹ Office of the European Union Representative (West Bank and Gaza Strip, UNRWA), *2025 Report on Israeli Settlements in the Occupied West Bank, including East Jerusalem*, reporting period January–December 2025, published 17 July 2026, Summary and section 3 (E1). <https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2026/documents/2025%20Report%20on%20Israeli%20settlements%20in%20the%20occupied%20West%20Bank.pdf>

FIGURE 2
Settlement housing units advanced through planning, 2025


Planning approvals; the EU notes these plans have not yet been implemented.

Source: Office of the EU Representative (West Bank and Gaza Strip, UNRWA), *2025 Report on Israeli Settlements*, July 2026.

The most strategically consequential decision of 2025 concerned the E1 area east of Jerusalem, adjoining the Ma'ale Adumim settlement. The Higher Planning Council gave final approval in August 2025 to plans for 3,401 housing units, and a construction tender for all 3,401 units was published on 10 December 2025. The EU assesses that the scheme would bisect the West Bank, sever it from East Jerusalem and displace thousands of Palestinians.^{40 41} Among those directly threatened are Bedouin communities in the Jerusalem periphery, including Jabal al-Baba, whose displacement would be a precondition for connecting Ma'ale Adumim to Jerusalem.⁴²

NOTE ON DATA

Settler and settlement counts differ between sources according to methodology: the CWRC counts 192 settlements and approximately 780,000 settlers including East Jerusalem, while the EU report records over 750,000 settlers across 147 official settlements plus outposts. The divergence reflects different treatment of East Jerusalem neighbourhoods, “neighbourhoods” recognised as independent settlements, and outposts. The Court has held that the distinction between settlements and outposts is immaterial for the purpose of determining whether a community forms part of Israel's settlement policy; what matters is whether it is established or maintained with Israel's support.⁴³

⁴⁰ Office of the European Union Representative (West Bank and Gaza Strip, UNRWA), *2025 Report on Israeli Settlements in the Occupied West Bank, including East Jerusalem*, reporting period January–December 2025, published 17 July 2026, Summary and section 3 (E1). <https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2026/documents/2025%20Report%20on%20Israeli%20settlements%20in%20the%20occupied%20West%20Bank.pdf>

⁴¹ Peace Now, “Israel Advances E1 Construction Tender, Severely Undermining the Viability of a Political Solution”, 10 December 2025 (Tender no. 460/2025 for all 3,401 housing units; Higher Planning Council approval in August 2025). <https://peacenow.org.il/en/e1-construction-tender>

⁴² Al-Baidar Organization for the Defense of Bedouin Rights, statements on the exposure of Bedouin communities in the Jerusalem periphery, including Jabal al-Baba, to the E1 scheme, as reported in 2026. <https://albaidar.ps/>

⁴³ International Court of Justice, Advisory Opinion, 19 July 2024, paras. 111–114 (the distinction between settlements and outposts is immaterial to whether a community forms part of Israel's settlement policy).

Settler violence


Settlers have attacked Palestinian communities through repeated raids on homes and villages, beatings, death threats demanding departure, persistent harassment, destruction of property and village infrastructure, the severing of water and electricity supplies, and the theft of livestock. These practices intensify a coercive environment that is also constituted by state measures — access restrictions, demolitions and settlement expansion — and that has the effect of displacing and dispossessing Palestinians. Communities that have attempted to return have found their villages fenced off or destroyed, or have faced renewed attacks forcing them to flee again.

Killings

The CWRC recorded 25 Palestinians killed in settler attacks between 1 January and 21 August 2026 — the highest annual toll since it began systematic documentation in 2019, and 79 per cent above the total for all of 2025. Across the whole period from 1 January 2019 to 21 August 2026 it recorded 87 killings, of which 61 occurred after 7 October 2023, representing just over 70 per cent of the total. Twelve of those killed were children under 18, and 41 were aged between 18 and 29; victims ranged in age from 14 to 72. Ramallah and Al-Bireh governorate accounted for 36 deaths and Nablus for 26 — together 71 per cent of the total — followed by Hebron with nine, Jerusalem and Salfit with five each, Bethlehem with three, Qalqilya with two, and one inside Israel's pre-1967 boundaries.⁴⁴

FIGURE 3

Palestinians killed in settler attacks by governorate, 1 January 2019 – 21 August 2026 (total: 87)




Ramallah & Al-Bireh and Nablus together account for 71 per cent of all killings. 61 of the 87 killings occurred after 7 October 2023; 12 victims were children.

Source: CWRC, statistical statement on Palestinians killed in settler attacks, 21 August 2026.

The annual series recorded by the CWRC shows a sharp transformation in the scale of lethal settler violence: two deaths in 2019, one in 2020, five in 2021 and six in 2022; 23 in 2023; 11 in 2024; 14 in 2025; and 25 in the first eight months of 2026. Twenty-six of the 87 killings occurred before 7 October 2023, including the 14 recorded between 2019 and 2022. PWWS is not aware of any of these cases having resulted in an effective prosecution.⁴⁵

⁴⁴ Colonization and Wall Resistance Commission (State of Palestine), statistical statement on Palestinians killed in settler attacks, 21 August 2026 (87 killed 1 January 2019 – 21 August 2026; 25 killed in 2026; 61 since 7 October 2023; 12 children; governorate and age distribution). <https://www.cwrc.ps/page-4879-en.html>

FIGURE 4
Palestinians killed in settler attacks per year, 2019–2026



2026 is already the deadliest year on record — 79 per cent above the total for the whole of 2025.

Source: CWRC, statistical statement, 21 August 2026. The 2026 figure covers eight months only.

OCHA, applying a different methodology, recorded that since the beginning of 2026 and as of late August, 79 Palestinians including 19 children had been killed and about 1,870 injured by Israeli forces or settlers in the West Bank, of whom 23 were killed and more than 1,040 injured in the context of settler attacks. OCHA also records that the frequency of injuries directly caused by settlers has risen from an average of one Palestinian injured every three days in 2020 to more than three per day in 2026.⁴⁶

Sexual violence

In April 2026 the West Bank Protection Consortium, led by the Norwegian Refugee Council, published research by Nicola Banks and Busaina Nazzal documenting gender-based and sexualised violence committed by Israeli settlers against Palestinians in Area C in contexts where Israeli forces were present and neither prevented nor halted the violence, nor effectively investigated it. The research identified at least 16 cases of conflict-related sexual violence attributed to Israeli settlers and soldiers, forming part of a wider pattern of sexualised harassment, intimidation and humiliation that the authors assess to be substantially under-reported. It records threats of rape, indecent exposure, sexualised insults and gestures, unwanted touching, degrading and invasive searches, forced nudity, stalking and surveillance of intimate spaces, and finds that such conduct increasingly occurs inside homes, bedrooms, courtyards, latrines and the immediate surroundings of family shelters.⁴⁷

⁴⁵ Colonization and Wall Resistance Commission (State of Palestine), statistical statement on Palestinians killed in settler attacks, 21 August 2026 (87 killed 1 January 2019 – 21 August 2026; 25 killed in 2026; 61 since 7 October 2023; 12 children; governorate and age distribution). <https://www.cwrc.ps/page-4879-en.html>

⁴⁶ OCHA, *Humanitarian Situation Report* | 28 August 2026, West Bank section (casualties and settler violence since the beginning of 2026; Education Cluster report of the entry of Israeli forces into a girls' secondary school in Jericho on 23 August 2026). <https://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanitarian-situation-report-28-august-2026>

⁴⁷ Banks and Nazzal, *Sexual Violence and Forcible Transfer in the West Bank*, April 2026, "Conflict-Related Sexual Violence", "Targeting of Women & Children" and "Intrusion into Domestic Space", pp. 8–11.

The consortium's findings are qualitative and are not presented as statistically representative of the West Bank as a whole. They nonetheless establish a documented pattern within the communities studied, occurring in an environment of impunity. The individual accounts are reproduced in Chapter II, where their gendered consequences are analysed, and the legal characterisation of this conduct is addressed in Chapter IV.

Independent corroboration exists. In March 2025 the Independent International Commission of Inquiry reported that Israeli security forces and settlers had committed sexual and gender-based violence against Palestinians, including forced public stripping and nudity, sexual harassment and threats of rape, and documented cases in which perpetrators photographed victims and disseminated the footage.⁴⁸ On 30 April 2026 UN experts warned that sexual and gender-based violence against Palestinians was driving displacement, describing settler violence as frequently occurring in the presence of Israeli forces and rarely prevented, investigated or prosecuted.⁴⁹

Pastoral and agricultural outposts

Over the past decade, and with particular intensity since 2021, settlers have established pastoral and agricultural outposts across the West Bank. These consist of farms and livestock pens placed on Palestinian land and spread across open hills for transient grazing. They are physically small but establish effective control over vast surrounding areas from which Palestinians are then excluded; they are subsequently incorporated into nearby settlements or supported by Israeli authorities under the description of “security farms”.⁵⁰



Caravans and structures of a settler outpost on a West Bank hilltop, above terraced agricultural land. Photo: WATTAN Media Network.

⁴⁸ Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and Israel, “*More than a Human Can Bear*”: Israel’s Systematic Use of Sexual, Reproductive and Other Forms of Gender-Based Violence since 7 October 2023, A/HRC/58/CRP.6, 13 March 2025. <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/hrbodies/hrcouncil/sessions-regular/session58/a-hrc-58-crp-6.pdf>

⁴⁹ OHCHR, joint statement of UN experts, “Sexual and gender-based violence against Palestinians driving displacement, warn UN experts”, 30 April 2026. <https://www.un.org/unispal/document/sexual-and-gender-based-violence-against-palestinians-driving-displacement-warn-un-experts/>

⁵⁰ Al-Baidar Organization for the Defense of Bedouin Rights, *Pastoral and Agricultural Enclaves in the West Bank: The Tragedy of Survival in Bedouin Communities*, documentation report. <https://albaidar.ps/>

Peace Now and Kerem Navot calculate that settlers operating shepherding outposts have taken control of at least 786,000 dunams — 14 per cent of the West Bank, an area larger than all conventional settlements combined. Only 40 per cent of the land taken is classified as “state land” even under Israel’s own definitions; approximately 41 per cent has been designated by the Israeli military as firing zones, and about 4.4 per cent lies within Areas A and B, nominally under Palestinian Authority jurisdiction.


⁵¹ The Al-Baidar Organization for the Defense of Bedouin Rights, which works directly with the affected communities, documented more than 100 pastoral outposts by the end of 2025 and records displacement from them of more than 7,000 Palestinians; it reports that approximately 1,100 Palestinians were displaced in 2025 alone from Mughayir al-Deir east of Ramallah, Arab al-Malihah in al-Mu’arrajat north of Jericho, Arab al-Jahalin west of Ramallah, Sha’ab Tima south-east of Bethlehem, and a Bedouin community in al-Malih in the northern Jordan Valley.⁵²

FIGURE 5

Pastoral outposts: land seized and communities displaced



STATUS OF THE LAND TAKEN BY SHEPHERDING OUTPOSTS



Only 40 per cent of the land taken is “state land” even under Israel’s own definitions.

Source: Kerem Navot and Peace Now, *The Bad Samaritan*, April 2025; OCHA data compiled by Amnesty International, 2026.

OCHA’s figures, which count displacement linked to specific documented incidents, are lower: at least 5,910 Palestinians from 117 predominantly Bedouin and herding communities in Area C between January 2023 and 30 April 2026, with at least 45 communities emptied entirely. Amnesty International, which compiled these figures, estimates that around 17 per cent of the Palestinian population of Bedouin and herding communities in Area C has been displaced.⁵³ The two figures are not inconsistent: they measure different things over different periods, and Al-Baidar’s direct community access captures displacement that is not attributable to a single documented incident.

⁵¹ Kerem Navot and Peace Now, *The Bad Samaritan: Land Grabbing by Settlers Through Grazing*, joint report, April 2025, Part One (land seized through shepherding outposts: 786,000 dunams; classification of land taken). <https://peacenow.org.il/en/the-bad-samaritan-land-grabbing-by-settlers-through-grazing>

⁵² Al-Baidar Organization for the Defense of Bedouin Rights, *Pastoral and Agricultural Enclaves in the West Bank: The Tragedy of Survival in Bedouin Communities*, documentation report. <https://albaidar.ps/>


⁵³ Amnesty International, *Israel’s Ethnic Cleansing of West Bank Bedouin and Herding Communities*, research report, 10 June 2026, sections “Settler violence as state policy” and “Conclusions and recommendations”. <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/research/2026/06/israel-west-bank-ethnic-cleansing/>

The mechanism is consistent. An outpost is erected near or inside a herding community; settlers restrict access to water and grazing; attacks on the community, its property, infrastructure and livestock recur; residents are injured or killed; and the community leaves.⁵⁴ The economic consequence is the collapse of pastoral livelihoods: livestock deaths, the need to buy expensive alternative fodder, falling dairy production, the felling of olive trees and the burning of crops. Chapter II analyses why this collapse falls first and hardest on women.

Access to farmland is obstructed by the same means. Between 6 and 8 August 2026, four attacks in Beit Furik and neighbouring Beit Dajan (Nablus) injured seven Palestinians, mostly while they were accessing agricultural land; in three of those incidents settlers were reported to be wearing military or military-style uniforms. On 7 August more than 200 olive trees were found vandalised in Deir Sharaf (Nablus) after landowners had been threatened and told not to return to their land; in Beitillu (Ramallah), settlers expelled farmers from agricultural land in Area B and set fire to a vehicle.⁵⁵ During the 2025 olive harvest, OCHA documented 150 harvest-related settler attacks between 1 October and 3 November affecting 77 villages and towns, injuring around 140 Palestinians and damaging more than 4,200 trees and saplings; October 2025 recorded the highest monthly number of settler attacks since OCHA began documenting them in 2006.⁵⁶ Across 2025 as a whole, settler attacks resulting in Palestinian casualties or property damage reached their highest recorded level, with more than 1,800 incidents documented.⁵⁷

FIGURE 6

The 2025 olive harvest under attack (1 October – 3 November 2025)



October 2025 saw the highest monthly number of settler attacks since OCHA began recording in 2006; more than 1,800 incidents were documented across 2025.

Source: OCHA, Humanitarian Situation Updates, 2025.

Settler violence also reaches those who attempt to service affected communities. Between 3 and 16 February 2026 settlers and Israeli forces prevented Palestinian Ministry of Agriculture staff from installing a water tank between Beit Dajan and Beit Furik, detaining six staff for about five hours and obstructing a project intended to serve roughly 400 agricultural greenhouses and nearby households.

⁵⁴ Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, press release, "Settler violence drives forced displacement in the West Bank", 29 January 2026. <https://palestine.un.org/en/node/309094>

⁵⁵ OCHA, *Humanitarian Situation Report | 14 August 2026*, West Bank section (WHO data on attacks affecting health care, January–July 2026; settler attacks in Beit Furik, Beit Dajan, Deir Sharaf and Beitillu; PRCS and ambulance incidents). <https://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanitarian-situation-report-14-august-2026>

⁵⁶ OCHA, *Humanitarian Situation Update #337 | West Bank*, November 2025 (olive-harvest-related settler attacks, 1 October – 3 November 2025). <https://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanitarian-situation-update-337-west-bank>

⁵⁷ Banks and Nazzari, *Sexual Violence and Forcible Transfer in the West Bank*, April 2026, "An Escalating Coercive Environment in the West Bank", p. 7, citing OCHA, *West Bank Monthly Snapshot – Casualties, Property Damage and Displacement*, December 2025, 21 January 2026.

⁵⁸ In Deir Jarir, settler attacks during 2025 killed two Palestinians and injured 28, including three women and four children, alongside the vandalism of homes, olive trees, agricultural equipment and livestock shelters.⁵⁹

Movement restrictions: checkpoints, closures and the Barrier

Movement inside the West Bank is governed by a dense system of fixed and mobile obstacles together with the Barrier, referred to in this report as the Annexation Wall where the context concerns its function of territorial appropriation, and as the Barrier where a cited source uses that term.



Women wait beside a closed and chained road gate on a West Bank road. Photo: © PWWSO.



As of December 2025 OCHA documented 925 movement obstacles permanently or intermittently restricting the movement of 3.4 million Palestinians across the West Bank including East Jerusalem — 43 per cent above the annual average of 647 obstacles over the preceding twenty years. These comprise 89 checkpoints staffed continuously, 218 partial checkpoints, 232 road gates (159 of them frequently closed), 114 linear closures, 167 earthmounds and 105 roadblocks. Checkpoints and road gates together now constitute nearly 60 per cent of all obstacles and form the backbone of the access régime; two decades ago this type of permanent infrastructure accounted for 15 per cent of obstacles. In 2025 alone OCHA documented the installation of more than 120 new road gates. At least half of all obstacles block or hinder access between Palestinian towns and villages and the main roads, and at least 20 per cent of documented closures block access to agricultural land.⁶⁰ This represents a marked deterioration from the 849 obstacles OCHA recorded in its survey of January–February 2025.⁶¹

⁵⁸ OCHA, *Humanitarian Situation Update #358 | West Bank*, February 2026 (obstruction of Ministry of Agriculture staff installing a water tank between Beit Dajan and Beit Furik). <https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/humanitarian-situation-update-358-west-bank>

⁵⁹ OCHA, *Humanitarian Situation Update #332 | West Bank*, 2025 (settler attacks in Deir Jarir). <https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/humanitarian-situation-update-332-west-bank-enarhe>

⁶⁰ United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), *Movement and Access in the West Bank*, Fact Sheet, 23 April 2026, “Key facts and figures” (data as of December 2025). <https://www.ochaopt.org/content/movement-and-access-west-bank-april-2026>

⁶¹ OCHA, *West Bank Movement and Access Update*, May 2025 (849 movement obstacles recorded in the January–February 2025 survey). <https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/west-bank-movement-and-access-update-may-2025>

FIGURE 7
925 movement obstacles restricting 3.4 million Palestinians (December 2025)

NUMBER OF OBSTACLES OVER TIME


Checkpoints and road gates now make up nearly 60 per cent of all obstacles; at least 20 per cent of closures block access to agricultural land. The 712-km Barrier, 85 per cent of which runs inside the West Bank, is additional.

Source: OCHA, *Movement and Access in the West Bank*, Fact Sheet, 23 April 2026; OCHA survey, January–February 2025.

The Barrier extends approximately 712 kilometres, of which 64 per cent is built and 85 per cent runs inside the West Bank rather than along the Green Line. Together with its gate and permit régime it remains the single largest obstacle to Palestinian movement. To reach agricultural land isolated between the Barrier and the Green Line, farmers must obtain special permits or prior coordination to cross about 62 agricultural gates, the majority of which are closed year-round. Since 7 October 2023 most permits have been revoked or suspended, including over 800 issued to nationally recruited humanitarian workers.⁶² In the H2 area of Hebron city, 101 of the 925 obstacles — and nearly 40 per cent of all checkpoints — are concentrated in an area home to about 7,000 Palestinians, whose access has been restricted since October 2023 to registered residents through three checkpoints operating between 07:00 and 20:00.⁶³

⁶² United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), *Movement and Access in the West Bank*, Fact Sheet, 23 April 2026, “Key facts and figures” (data as of December 2025). <https://www.ochaopt.org/content/movement-and-access-west-bank-april-2026>

⁶³ United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), *Movement and Access in the West Bank*, Fact Sheet, 23 April 2026, “Key facts and figures” (data as of December 2025). <https://www.ochaopt.org/content/movement-and-access-west-bank-april-2026>



A long queue of vehicles waiting at a checkpoint on a West Bank road. **Photo: WATTAN Media Network.**

These restrictions are the subject matter of the 2004 Advisory Opinion, in which the Court held that the route of the wall within the OPT and its associated régime impede the liberty of movement guaranteed by Article 12 ICCPR and the exercise of the rights to work, health, education and an adequate standard of living under the ICESCR, and that these impediments could not be justified by military exigency or the requirements of public order.⁶⁴ The same proportionality reasoning applies to the present checkpoint network and to the “prior coordination” requirements imposed on ambulance movement documented by WHO.

⁶⁴ International Court of Justice, *Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory*, Advisory Opinion, 9 July 2004, I.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 136. <https://www.icj-cij.org/case/131>



CHAPTER



A Palestinian woman presents her identity documents to an Israeli soldier at a checkpoint. Photo: © PWWSO.

Gendered Consequences for Palestinian Women and Girls

The policies established in Chapter I do not affect Palestinian women and men identically. This chapter sets out how and why they fall differently on women and girls. Where the underlying data are not sex-disaggregated, the basis of the gender analysis is stated.

IN THIS CHAPTER

- 01** Gender-based and sexual violence
- 02** Displacement and loss of safety
- 03** Economic marginalisation and rural livelihoods
- 04** Reproductive and maternal healthcare
- 05** Education
- 06** Mental health and unpaid care
- 07** Public and civic participation



Gender-based and sexual violence

Sexualised violence in the West Bank operates within, and reinforces, a coercive environment. The West Bank Protection Consortium assesses that it functions as a coercive tool that penetrates domestic space, fractures family life and renders continued civilian residence untenable.⁶⁵ OHCHR and UN experts have described sexualised violence as a method of domination that instils fear, exploits stigma and shame, isolates survivors, fractures communities and contributes to displacement.⁶⁶

Three features of the documented pattern are specifically gendered.

First, the location of the violence. The consortium records a shift from public and communal areas into intimate domestic space. Women in Susiya described harassment while hanging laundry or supervising children only metres from their front doors, and others described drones hovering outside bedroom windows and cameras directed at beds. In Ras Ein al-Auja a woman reported settlers attempting to force open a latrine door while she was inside. In Wadi al-Qilt, participants reported settlers entering homes at night and announcing that they would sleep in residents' beds; in Khirbet Zanuta, settlers were said to have entered homes, harassed children and thrown stun grenades into bedrooms. Participants in multiple locations described settlers exposing themselves, making threats of rape and stalking women walking to latrines.⁶⁷ The effect is to remove the distinction between public exposure and private refuge on which women's daily security depends.

Second, the timing and targeting. Participants described armed settlers increasingly targeting women and children, including in incidents timed for moments when men were absent. Communities including Ein al-Rashash described intrusions during daytime hours when men had left for work or to access livelihoods. In Susiya, participants described settlers physically assaulting a woman in her home during daytime hours. Participants also described Israeli soldiers entering homes and questioning women when men were not present, including on matters perceived as intimate or culturally taboo.⁶⁸ A human-rights organisation representative interviewed in 2025 observed that an unwritten rule exempting women and children no longer exists.⁶⁹

Third, the involvement of State agents. One woman from a Bedouin community said that settlers arrived at her home accompanied by Israeli forces, and that two female soldiers ordered her to remove her clothes and carried out a full-body inspection while she was naked, instructing her to open her legs in a way that caused pain, making derogatory comments and touching intimate areas.⁷⁰ Conduct of this kind is not private violence to which the State has failed to respond; it is conduct by State agents.

⁶⁵ Banks and Nazzal, *Sexual Violence and Forcible Transfer in the West Bank*, April 2026, "Conflict-Related Sexual Violence", "Targeting of Women & Children" and "Intrusion into Domestic Space", pp. 8–11.

⁶⁶ OHCHR, joint statement of UN experts, "Sexual and gender-based violence against Palestinians driving displacement, warn UN experts", 30 April 2026. <https://www.un.org/unispal/document/sexual-and-gender-based-violence-against-palestinians-driving-displacement-warn-un-experts/>

⁶⁷ Banks and Nazzal, *Sexual Violence and Forcible Transfer in the West Bank*, April 2026, "Documented Forms of Sexualised Violence", p. 8.

⁶⁸ Banks and Nazzal, *Sexual Violence and Forcible Transfer in the West Bank*, April 2026, "Conflict-Related Sexual Violence", "Targeting of Women & Children" and "Intrusion into Domestic Space", pp. 8–11.

⁶⁹ Banks and Nazzal, *Sexual Violence and Forcible Transfer in the West Bank*, April 2026, "Targeting of Women & Children", p. 9 (human rights organisation representative, Tel Aviv, 2025).

⁷⁰ Banks and Nazzal, *Sexual Violence and Forcible Transfer in the West Bank*, April 2026, "Targeting of Women & Children", p. 10.

Documented accounts

The following accounts are drawn from the consortium's April 2026 research. Locations and identities are withheld where the source withheld them. Direct quotations from participants are marked as such; the remaining items are incidents recorded in the consortium's narrative and are summarised here.

ACCOUNT 1 · Beit Dajan, 2026

A girl from the community said: *"The settler constantly makes inappropriate gestures toward me."*⁷¹

ACCOUNT 2 · Susiya, 2026

A humanitarian worker based in Jerusalem reported: *"In Susiya, testimony was documented regarding sexual harassment and provocative acts carried out by settlers against a woman in her own house. Settlers pushed her to the wall in front of her children and said verbal sexual words, within the context of repeated attacks aimed at intimidating residents and forcing them to leave their land."*⁷²

ACCOUNT 3 · location withheld, 2025

A humanitarian worker based in Hebron reported: *"An adult Palestinian woman reported sexual assault allegedly perpetrated by Israeli settlers and in the presence of members of the Israeli military in [location withheld]. The incident occurred within a militarised environment where soldiers exercised control over access and movement. The case was assessed as high risk at the time of reporting."*⁷³

ACCOUNT 4 · Jordan Valley Bedouin community, specific

The consortium records a violent settler raid in which witnesses state that a Palestinian man was subjected to severe sexual assault in front of his family, and testimonies indicate that women and girls were beaten, children were threatened with death and threats of rape were made, while residents remained largely unprotected.⁷⁴

ACCOUNT 5 · Bethlehem governorate

Testimony collected during a key-informant interview described two 15-year-old boys herding cattle whom settlers attacked, beat, blindfolded and stripped; the account stated that one boy was urinated on and that the other sustained a leg fracture.⁷⁵

⁷¹ Banks and Nazzal, *Sexual Violence and Forcible Transfer in the West Bank*, April 2026, p. 9 (community member, girl, Beit Dajan, 2026).

⁷² Banks and Nazzal, *Sexual Violence and Forcible Transfer in the West Bank*, April 2026, "Targeting of Women & Children", p. 10 (humanitarian worker, Jerusalem, 2026).

⁷³ Banks and Nazzal, *Sexual Violence and Forcible Transfer in the West Bank*, April 2026, "Targeting of Women & Children", p. 10 (humanitarian worker, Hebron, 2025).

⁷⁴ Banks and Nazzal, *Sexual Violence and Forcible Transfer in the West Bank*, April 2026, "Conflict-Related Sexual Violence", p. 8 (Jordan Valley Bedouin community; the report in turn cites Haaretz, 16 March 2026).

⁷⁵ Banks and Nazzal, *Sexual Violence and Forcible Transfer in the West Bank*, April 2026, "Documented Forms of Sexualised Violence", p. 8 (key-informant interview, Bethlehem governorate).

ACCOUNT 6 · Wadi al-Seeq

After the community was forcibly displaced, three men reported that settlers detained them and attempted to sexually assault one man with a broomstick while he was blindfolded; they described forced stripping, beatings, burning and being urinated on, and said that the perpetrators circulated images of the abuse.⁷⁶

ACCOUNT 7 · location withheld, 2025

A woman from a displaced community said: *“We left the area not by our own will, nor because we wanted to leave or abandon it. On the contrary, we left after long patience and long suffering. They tried to drive us out in every way, using the worst methods against us. In the end, they resorted to targeting women and terrorizing them. They confined a woman in a room and placed a settler at the door while she was alone inside. This was the last incident that happened before we left. it was the straw that broke the camel’s back. This method is what forced us to leave our land in exchange for protecting the women.”*⁷⁷

Accounts 5 and 6 concern men and boys. They are retained because they establish that sexualised violence is deployed across the community, and because the consortium found that threats and violence against female relatives are used simultaneously to harm women and to humiliate male family members — a dynamic that increases pressure on women from within the household as well as from outside it.⁷⁸

Under-reporting and the absence of remedy

Survivors rarely disclose these incidents to authorities or service providers. The consortium attributes under-reporting to stigma, conservative social norms, pervasive insecurity, the power imbalance associated with the occupation, and fear of retaliation; one woman reported that a senior Israeli military officer repeatedly contacted and threatened her after she considered reporting a violation.⁷⁹ There is, in practice, no accessible avenue of complaint: Israeli investigative mechanisms are inaccessible and rarely produce prosecutions, and Palestinian institutions have no jurisdiction over Israeli settlers or soldiers. This is a principal reason why the capacity of Palestinian women’s organisations to document, refer and accompany survivors — addressed in Chapter III — is itself a protection issue.

Displacement and loss of safety

Displacement in the communities studied is not the product of a single event. The consortium found that violence from settlers was a driver in 84 per cent of surveyed cases of forcible transfer, alongside a pervasive sense of insecurity (60 per cent), movement restrictions (48 per cent), loss of access to water and electricity (48 per cent), psychological and emotional distress (48 per cent) and fear of losing

⁷⁶ Banks and Nazzal, *Sexual Violence and Forcible Transfer in the West Bank*, April 2026, “Documented Forms of Sexualised Violence”, p. 8 (Wadi al-Seeq; the report in turn cites *The Times of Israel*, 20 October 2023).

⁷⁷ Banks and Nazzal, *Sexual Violence and Forcible Transfer in the West Bank*, April 2026, “Drivers of Forced Displacement”, p. 13 (community member, woman, location withheld, 2025).

⁷⁸ Banks and Nazzal, *Sexual Violence and Forcible Transfer in the West Bank*, April 2026, “Conflict-Related Sexual Violence”, “Targeting of Women & Children” and “Intrusion into Domestic Space”, pp. 8–11.

⁷⁹ Banks and Nazzal, *Sexual Violence and Forcible Transfer in the West Bank*, April 2026, “Conflict-Related Sexual Violence”, p. 8.

livelihoods (40 per cent). More than 70 per cent of surveyed households identified violence against women and children — including sexual harassment targeting girls and physical assaults against boys — as the decisive factor in their decision to leave.⁸⁰

“

They tried to drive us out in every way, using the worst methods against us. In the end, they resorted to targeting women and terrorizing them.

— Woman from a displaced community, 2025 (West Bank Protection Consortium)

FIGURE 8

What drove households to leave? Drivers of forcible transfer (% of surveyed cases)



DECISIVE FACTOR

More than 70% of displaced households named violence against women and children — including sexual harassment of girls — as the decisive reason for leaving.

Source: West Bank Protection Consortium (N. Banks and B. Nazzal), research on sexual violence and forcible transfer, April 2026.

KEY FINDING

This is a finding of considerable legal significance, and it is sex-specific: the decisive cause of displacement, as reported by the displaced themselves, was the inability to protect women and girls.

Families respond with gendered protective strategies that transfer the cost of insecurity onto women:

- **Restriction of women's movement.** Men described limiting the movement of women and girls to reduce exposure to harassment and assault. Women said these measures left them increasingly confined to the home, dependent on male relatives for movement outside the community, and carrying greater responsibility for childcare, food preparation, water collection and care of older relatives.⁸¹

⁸⁰ Banks and Nazzal, *Sexual Violence and Forcible Transfer in the West Bank*, April 2026, “Key Findings”, p. 5.

- **Partial transfer.** Families relocate women and children to towns or relatives' homes perceived as safer while men remain behind. In communities such as Wadi al-Seeq, Anata and Ras al-Tin, families first sent women and children away and then watched social bonds weaken and services collapse: without women's daily presence informal networks of mutual aid fractured, and without children, schools and communal activities faltered.⁸²
- **Early marriage.** Families arranged marriages for daughters aged 15 to 17 in order to move them to households perceived as safer. The consortium recorded at least six such cases in recent years, against a national trend in which marriages of girls under 18 had fallen from about 24 per cent of registered marriages in 2010 to around 12 per cent in 2021.⁸³

Relocation does not end exposure. Most displaced families move onto land owned by others without formal tenure, into makeshift roadside shelters or onto the edges of towns, without reliable water, sanitation or electricity. Women described thin shelter walls, shared or improvised sanitation and limited privacy, and the loss of the informal networks of sisters, mothers and trusted neighbours that had previously provided practical help and emotional support.⁸⁴ Displacement also narrows women's channels of influence: in several Bedouin communities, kitchens once stood near communal gathering areas, allowing women to follow deliberations and shape outcomes through conversation and mediation; after relocation to scattered shelters or dense peripheral settings, those channels contracted.

85



Structures of a Palestinian herding community beside an Israeli settlement, West Bank. **Photo: Indigenous residents of Umm al-Khair; Masafer Yatta Municipal Council / Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA 2.5.**

Harassment frequently continues in the new location, and overcrowding and financial strain increase tension within households. Women described frustration and powerlessness spilling into the home. As one woman displaced to Beit Dajan put it in 2025: *"He was never like this before. But now, with no*

⁸¹ Banks and Nazzal, *Sexual Violence and Forcible Transfer in the West Bank*, April 2026, "Community Coping under Sustained Coercion", p. 12.

⁸² Banks and Nazzal, *Sexual Violence and Forcible Transfer in the West Bank*, April 2026, "Partial Forcible Transfer", p. 14.

⁸³ Banks and Nazzal, *Sexual Violence and Forcible Transfer in the West Bank*, April 2026, "Early Marriage Under Displacement Pressure", pp. 14–15.

⁸⁴ Banks and Nazzal, *Sexual Violence and Forcible Transfer in the West Bank*, April 2026, "Protection and Community Life After Relocation", p. 17.

*work, no land, and no peace, he takes it out on me.*⁸⁶ PWWSO notes that this is a documented pathway by which occupation-related dispossession increases intimate-partner violence, and that it is a pathway for which no adequate referral or shelter capacity currently exists in the affected communities.

Economic marginalisation and rural livelihoods

In Area C, land anchors both economic survival and social identity. The division of labour in herding and Bedouin communities is well documented: men typically manage grazing routes and market access, while women produce dairy, process wool, forage, weave and maintain the household economies linked to livestock; children assist with herding and water collection.⁸⁷ Because women's productive work is tied to proximity to land, livestock and household space, the loss of access to land removes women's income first and most completely.



Demolished agricultural structures in a Palestinian herding community beside an Israeli settlement, West Bank. Photo: Indigenous residents of Umm al-Khair; Masafer Yatta Municipal Council / Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA 2.5.

The consortium's data bear this out. Among households that experienced forcible transfer, 92 per cent lost access to grazing and agricultural land, 88 per cent lost their house or shelter, 84 per cent lost furniture, livestock or agricultural assets, and 56 per cent lost access to livelihood opportunities. **Eighty-seven per cent of women who experienced forcible transfer reported losing all sources of income, including dairy production, embroidery, foraging and beekeeping.**⁸⁸ One woman described losing an embroidery business she had sustained for fifteen years; a widowed mother of seven in the southern West Bank lost the livestock, buyers and market access on which a small dairy enterprise depended.⁸⁹

⁸⁵ Banks and Nazzari, *Sexual Violence and Forcible Transfer in the West Bank*, April 2026, "Protection and Community Life After Relocation", p. 17.

⁸⁶ Banks and Nazzari, *Sexual Violence and Forcible Transfer in the West Bank*, April 2026, "Protection and Community Life After Relocation", p. 17.

⁸⁷ Banks and Nazzari, *Sexual Violence and Forcible Transfer in the West Bank*, April 2026, "Collapse of Pastoral Livelihoods", pp. 17–18.

⁸⁸ Banks and Nazzari, *Sexual Violence and Forcible Transfer in the West Bank*, April 2026, "Collapse of Pastoral Livelihoods", pp. 17–18.

⁸⁹ Banks and Nazzari, *Sexual Violence and Forcible Transfer in the West Bank*, April 2026, "Collapse of Pastoral Livelihoods", pp. 17–18.

FIGURE 9

The cost of forcible transfer, and who bears it

HOUSEHOLDS THAT EXPERIENCED FORCIBLE TRANSFER


87%

of women lost all sources of income — dairy, embroidery, foraging, beekeeping

90%

of women reported increased psychological stress and trauma

Source: West Bank Protection Consortium, April 2026.

Activities of this kind are largely invisible in conventional labour statistics, which is why aggregate employment data understate the economic effect of displacement on women. PWWSO emphasises this point for the attention of the Committee: the harm is real, quantified in the consortium's survey, and systematically excluded from the national accounts against which reparations and recovery programming are usually designed.

Access restrictions produce the same effect without displacement. OCHA records that at least 20 per cent of movement obstacles block access to agricultural land, and that Palestinian farmers must obtain permits or prior coordination to cross about 62 agricultural gates through the Barrier, the majority of which are closed year-round.⁹⁰ In 2025 Israeli military operations in the northern West Bank damaged irrigation systems, greenhouses, agricultural roads, water infrastructure and electricity systems; farmers struggled to obtain fodder, seeds and water, and some producers suspended operations.⁹¹ In January 2026 OCHA reported that more than 72,000 farming and herding families required urgent agricultural assistance.⁹²

Water infrastructure is a gendered issue because women and girls carry the primary responsibility for household water management and care. OCHA reported that Israeli operations damaged water and sewage infrastructure in Jenin, Tulkarm and surrounding areas, requiring emergency water trucking for displaced people and households disconnected from public supply;⁹³ and that in August 2025 the closure of two artesian wells reduced water availability by 20 per cent for nearly 23,000 residents of Beit Dajan and Beit Furik, affecting drinking water, irrigation and the local network.⁹⁴ When

⁹⁰ United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), *Movement and Access in the West Bank*, Fact Sheet, 23 April 2026, "Key facts and figures" (data as of December 2025). <https://www.ochaopt.org/content/movement-and-access-west-bank-april-2026>

⁹¹ OCHA, *Northern West Bank Humanitarian Response Update* | 21 January – 30 April 2025, published 11 July 2025. <https://www.ochaopt.org/content/northern-west-bank-humanitarian-response-update-21-january-30-april-2025>

⁹² OCHA, *Humanitarian Situation Update* #354 | West Bank, 22 January 2026. <https://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanitarian-situation-update-354-west-bank>

⁹³ OCHA, *Northern West Bank Humanitarian Response Update* | 21 January – 30 April 2025, published 11 July 2025. <https://www.ochaopt.org/content/northern-west-bank-humanitarian-response-update-21-january-30-april-2025>

⁹⁴ OCHA, *Humanitarian Situation Update* #312 | West Bank, 7 August 2025 (settler attacks in August 2025; displacement from Barriyyet Kisan; closure of two artesian wells affecting Beit Dajan and Beit Furik; mental-health and psychosocial support figures for 2025). <https://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanitarian-situation-update-312-west-bank>

water points and sanitation facilities are damaged or closed, women and girls face greater exposure to harassment while collecting water or using shared facilities — a risk that rises further in displacement sites, particularly for adolescent girls, pregnant women, women with disabilities and survivors of gender-based violence.

At the macroeconomic level, UNCTAD reported that intensified closures and the near-total halt of Palestinian labour access to Israel drove GDP per capita down by 21 per cent and unemployment up to 32 per cent.⁹⁵ The aggregate figures are not sex-disaggregated. PWWSO's assessment, supported by the consortium's household-level data, is that the gendered distribution of this contraction is severe: men lose wage employment, women lose the asset-based and home-based production that had cushioned the household, and women then absorb the additional unpaid labour of managing displacement, securing food and water, and supporting traumatised family members. The result is not only lost income but a reduction in economic autonomy, bargaining power and participation in community decisions.

Reproductive and maternal healthcare

Healthcare access in the West Bank is shaped by the checkpoint and closure régime established in Chapter I, by military operations and settlement-related closures, by permit requirements, and by direct attacks on health facilities, ambulances and personnel.

Between January and July 2026 WHO recorded 98 attacks affecting health care in the West Bank: 37 in July alone, compared with eight in June and a monthly average of about ten during the first six months of the year. These attacks affected 83 health transport vehicles and 11 health facilities and resulted in 33 injuries and four deaths. Obstruction of health-care delivery was documented in 92 incidents; 66 involved the use of force against health care, 25 the arrest or detention of health personnel or patients, and 13 militarised searches of personnel, facilities or transport. WHO identifies obstruction and detention at checkpoints, full closures during operations, and requirements for prior coordination of ambulance movements among the factors impeding access to care.⁹⁶


⁹⁵ United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, *Report on UNCTAD Assistance to the Palestinian People: Developments in the Economy of the Occupied Palestinian Territory*, TD/B/72/3, 30 September 2025. <https://www.un.org/unispal/document/unctad-report-30sep25/>

⁹⁶ OCHA, *Humanitarian Situation Report | 14 August 2026*, West Bank section (WHO data on attacks affecting health care, January–July 2026; settler attacks in Beit Furik, Beit Dajan, Deir Sharaf and Beitillu; PRCs and ambulance incidents). <https://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanitarian-situation-report-14-august-2026>


FIGURE 10

98 attacks affecting health care in the West Bank, January–July 2026

ATTACKS PER MONTH




INCIDENTS BY TYPE (CATEGORIES OVERLAP)



Source: World Health Organization, attacks on health care in the West Bank, January–July 2026.

Attacks reach emergency responders directly. On 7 August 2026 settlers attacked a Palestine Red Crescent Society team responding to reports of injuries near Abu Njeim (Bethlehem), injuring four Palestinians including two paramedics who were sprayed with pepper spray, and damaging three PRCS vehicles and a mobile water tanker. Late on 10 August 2026 settlers reportedly stopped an ambulance that had obtained coordinated access to evacuate a sick child; it was able to proceed after Israeli forces arrived.⁹⁷

⁹⁷ OCHA, *Humanitarian Situation Report | 14 August 2026*, West Bank section (WHO data on attacks affecting health care, January–July 2026; settler attacks in Beit Furik, Beit Dajan, Deir Sharaf and Beitillu; PRCS and ambulance incidents). <https://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanitarian-situation-report-14-august-2026>




An ambulance stopped by Israeli soldiers at a checkpoint and road gate, West Bank. **Photo: WATTAN Media Network.**

These obstructions have specific consequences for women. Antenatal care, emergency obstetric referral, postnatal follow-up, contraception, cervical and breast cancer screening and treatment, and services for survivors of gender-based violence all depend on predictable movement between a household and a facility — the precise thing the obstacle régime removes. UNFPA reported in February 2026 that only 42 per cent of health facilities in the West Bank were fully operational, and that roadblocks, checkpoints, curfews and insecurity routinely delayed or prevented pregnant women from reaching essential services, while ambulance crews and health workers faced frequent delays, obstruction and at times physical assault.⁹⁸ Across the West Bank, more than 230,000 women and girls have limited or no access to reproductive health services, among them some 14,800 pregnant women.⁹⁹ In January 2026 OCHA reported that approximately 232,000 women and girls, including 14,800 pregnant women, had limited access to reproductive-health services, particularly in Jenin, Tulkarm and Tubas.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁸ United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), “West Bank: How movement restrictions threaten motherhood — and why UNFPA’s support is vital”, 1 February 2026. <https://arabstates.unfpa.org/en/news/west-bank-how-movement-restrictions-threaten-motherhood%E2%80%94and-why-unfpas-support-vital>

⁹⁹ UNFPA, “A safe space on wheels reaches women in remote West Bank communities”, 19 September 2025 (over 230,000 women and girls with limited or no access to reproductive health services, among them some 14,800 pregnant women). <https://www.un.org/unispal/?p=311486>

¹⁰⁰ OCHA, *Humanitarian Situation Update #354 | West Bank*, 22 January 2026. <https://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanitarian-situation-update-354-west-bank>

FIGURE 11
Reproductive and maternal health: access under closure


Source: UNFPA, 1 February 2026; OCHA, Humanitarian Situation Update #354, 22 January 2026.

OHCHR reported in March 2025, citing UNFPA, that there are 73,000 pregnant women in the West Bank, many of whom encounter critical health risks because movement restrictions and checkpoint closures severely limit access to antenatal, postnatal and delivery care.¹⁰¹ The same report recorded that in February 2025 Sondos Shalabi, aged 23 and eight months pregnant, was shot and killed while fleeing with her husband from Nur Shams refugee camp; her unborn child did not survive and her husband was critically wounded.^{102 103}

Service providers have responded by bringing care closer to women. UNFPA supports midwives at ten safe-motherhood centres established specifically to mitigate movement restrictions, which provided essential services to more than 3,000 women between October and December 2025, and five mobile health clinics operated by the Palestine Medical Relief Society reaching displaced and hard-to-reach communities in Jenin and Tulkarm.¹⁰⁴ OCHA reported that UNFPA and partners reached nearly 19,000 people through mobile clinics between October and December 2025 and provided protection and mental-health services to more than 9,000 people.¹⁰⁵ Two women who reached the centres described what access costs. One arrived already eight centimetres dilated after a difficult journey at night through checkpoints; a 32-year-old woman who was 38 weeks pregnant and experiencing severe complications reached the Biddya centre and said it was a blessing to have a centre providing care for pregnant women given the road closures and checkpoints that make reaching a hospital nearly impossible.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰¹ OHCHR, "On the brink: Women in the Occupied Palestinian Territory", March 2025 (UNFPA figure of 73,000 pregnant women in the West Bank; killing of Sondos Shalabi; increased targeting of women human-rights defenders). <https://www.ohchr.org/en/stories/2025/03/brink-women-occupied-palestinian-territory>

¹⁰² OHCHR, "On the brink: Women in the Occupied Palestinian Territory", March 2025 (UNFPA figure of 73,000 pregnant women in the West Bank; killing of Sondos Shalabi; increased targeting of women human-rights defenders). <https://www.ohchr.org/en/stories/2025/03/brink-women-occupied-palestinian-territory>

¹⁰³ Reuters, "Two Palestinian women killed in Israeli West Bank raid", 9 February 2025 (Sundos Jamal Mohammed Shalabi, 23, eight months pregnant, shot in Nur Shams; her unborn child did not survive; her husband was critically wounded).

¹⁰⁴ United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), "West Bank: How movement restrictions threaten motherhood — and why UNFPA's support is vital", 1 February 2026. <https://arabstates.unfpa.org/en/news/west-bank-how-movement-restrictions-threaten-motherhood%E2%80%94and-why-unfpas-support-vital>


¹⁰⁵ OCHA, Humanitarian Situation Update #354 | West Bank, 22 January 2026. <https://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanitarian-situation-update-354-west-bank>

These accounts illustrate a distinction that matters for the assessment of State obligations: a service that is formally available may remain practically inaccessible. Reproductive health in the West Bank cannot be separated from freedom of movement, the condition of roads, ambulance access and protection from settler harassment.

Education

Education-related incidents are documented in the West Bank at a scale that has risen sharply since 2023. During the first half of 2026 the Education Cluster documented 224 education-related incidents in the West Bank including East Jerusalem — incidents in or around schools or on the way to and from school — directly affecting 152 schools, 20,450 students and 859 education personnel. In the two years to the end of 2025, more than 550 such incidents were documented, including the killing, injury and detention of students, the demolition of schools, military use of school buildings and denial of access.

¹⁰⁷ ¹⁰⁸ Between July and September 2025 alone the Education Cluster documented 93 incidents, of which 40 per cent involved access impediments and 38 per cent the entry of military forces into schools; Hebron governorate accounted for 48 of them. ¹⁰⁹



Women and children cross on foot past closed road gates at the entrance to an Area A town, West Bank. **Photo: WATTAN Media Network.**


Schools are also threatened with destruction. As of 20 October 2025, 85 schools across the West Bank including East Jerusalem were under pending demolition or stop-work orders — 55 facing full demolition and 30 subject to partial orders. If implemented, these orders would affect the education of more

¹⁰⁶ United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), "West Bank: How movement restrictions threaten motherhood — and why UNFPA's support is vital", 1 February 2026. <https://arabstates.unfpa.org/en/news/west-bank-how-movement-restrictions-threaten-motherhood%E2%80%94and-why-unfpa-support-vital>

¹⁰⁷ UNICEF, press release, "More than 830,000 children return to school across the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, amid insecurity and access challenges", September 2026 (224 education-related incidents in the first half of 2026, affecting 152 schools, 20,450 students and 859 education personnel).

¹⁰⁸ UNICEF, "A demolition of homes, of schools, and of childhood", statement, 2026 (more than 550 documented education-related incidents in the two years to the end of 2025). <https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/demolition-homes-schools-and-childhood>

than 13,000 students, **including 6,557 girls**, taught by 1,089 teachers, **649 of whom are women**.¹¹⁰ Many further schools remain at risk because they are located in Area C communities facing displacement. On 23 August 2026, weeks before the start of the school year, Israeli forces entered a girls' secondary school in Jericho and damaged parts of the building.¹¹¹

FIGURE 12
Schools under demolition or stop-work orders (as of 20 October 2025)


The student total is reported as "more than 13,000"; the boys/other segment is therefore approximate.

Source: Education Cluster, as cited in the report; incident data for H1 2026: 224 incidents, 152 schools, 20,450 students.

The aggregate incident data are not sex-disaggregated, but three gendered consequences are established by sources that do disaggregate or that address the mechanism directly:

- 1. Journey risk falls differently.** The consortium found that families restrict girls' movement specifically to reduce exposure to harassment and assault, and that girls have dropped out of school to avoid encountering settlers or soldiers on the route.¹¹²
- 2. Displacement removes girls from school and into marriage.** Forty per cent of children affected by displacement lost access to education, and families arranged marriages for daughters aged 15 to 17 in order to move them out of high-risk communities; girls who married left school.^{113 114}
- 3. Sanitation and privacy.** Where schools are damaged, overcrowded or relocated, the loss of functioning, private sanitation disproportionately affects adolescent girls' attendance during menstruation.

¹⁰⁹ OCHA, *Humanitarian Situation Update #333 | West Bank*, October 2025, "Challenges facing Access to Education" (93 education-related incidents July–September 2025; 85 schools under pending demolition or stop-work orders as of 20 October 2025, affecting more than 13,000 students including 6,557 girls and 1,089 teachers, 649 of them women). <https://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanitarian-situation-update-333-west-bank>

¹¹⁰ OCHA, *Humanitarian Situation Update #333 | West Bank*, October 2025, "Challenges facing Access to Education" (93 education-related incidents July–September 2025; 85 schools under pending demolition or stop-work orders as of 20 October 2025, affecting more than 13,000 students including 6,557 girls and 1,089 teachers, 649 of them women). <https://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanitarian-situation-update-333-west-bank>

¹¹¹ OCHA, *Humanitarian Situation Report | 28 August 2026*, West Bank section (casualties and settler violence since the beginning of 2026; Education Cluster report of the entry of Israeli forces into a girls' secondary school in Jericho on 23 August 2026). <https://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanitarian-situation-report-28-august-2026>

¹¹² Banks and Nazzal, *Sexual Violence and Forcible Transfer in the West Bank*, April 2026, "Community Coping under Sustained Coercion", p. 12.

¹¹³ Banks and Nazzal, *Sexual Violence and Forcible Transfer in the West Bank*, April 2026, "Key Findings", p. 5.

¹¹⁴ Banks and Nazzal, *Sexual Violence and Forcible Transfer in the West Bank*, April 2026, "Early Marriage Under Displacement Pressure", pp. 14–15.

Boys face a distinct and severe pattern: they are pushed into child labour and high-risk tasks including herding and water collection, and adolescent boys are often treated as adults during incursions, facing arrest, beatings and shootings.¹¹⁵ Both forms of exclusion narrow young people's futures. The particular consequence for girls is that early marriage forecloses education, mobility, bodily autonomy and later access to paid work and public participation in a way that is difficult to reverse.

Mental health and unpaid care

The psychological consequences of the pattern documented in this report are severe, sustained and unequally distributed. Among households that experienced forcible transfer, 90 per cent of women reported increased psychological stress and trauma; 63 per cent of participants reported increased fear, anxiety and trauma among children; and 58 per cent said that children had lost safe places to play. Parents described bed-wetting, withdrawal, aggression and nightmares linked to armed settlers approaching homes or forces entering communities at night.¹¹⁶

Women carry the resulting care burden. OCHA reported that protection partners supported more than 45,600 children through mental-health and psychosocial services in 2025 and supported at least 9,650 caregivers.¹¹⁷ The ratio is itself a finding: caregivers — overwhelmingly women — received support at roughly one-fifth the rate of children. PWWS's assessment is that this produces a gendered care deficit in which the person expected to stabilise the household is among those most affected by violence and loss, and is least likely to receive treatment. Women also carry the additional unpaid labour created by displacement: longer journeys to collect water across exposed terrain, accompanying children to fields, springs and grazing routes to deter harassment, and managing households in shelters without services. The consortium records that these journeys reduce the time available for income-generating activity and heighten exhaustion and anxiety.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁵ Banks and Nazzal, *Sexual Violence and Forcible Transfer in the West Bank*, April 2026, "Drivers of Forced Displacement", pp. 13–14, citing Global Protection Cluster, *oPt (West Bank) Protection Analysis Update*, 23 January 2026.

¹¹⁶ Banks and Nazzal, *Sexual Violence and Forcible Transfer in the West Bank*, April 2026, "Psychological Consequences", p. 16.

¹¹⁷ OCHA, *Humanitarian Situation Update #312 | West Bank*, 7 August 2025 (settler attacks in August 2025; displacement from Barriyyet Kisan; closure of two artesian wells affecting Beit Dajan and Beit Furik; mental-health and psychosocial support figures for 2025). <https://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanitarian-situation-update-312-west-bank>

¹¹⁸ Banks and Nazzal, *Sexual Violence and Forcible Transfer in the West Bank*, April 2026, "Community Coping under Sustained Coercion", p. 12.

FIGURE 13

The care gap: mental-health and psychosocial support in 2025

Children supported

45,600



Caregivers supported

9,650



Each figure ≈ 1,000 people

Caregivers — overwhelmingly women — were reached at roughly one-fifth the rate of children.

Source: OCHA, protection partners' reporting for 2025.

Public and civic participation

The cumulative effect of the measures documented above is a contraction of the space in which Palestinian women act publicly. Movement restrictions impede access to organisations, markets, fields, schools, hospitals, religious sites and public meetings. Displacement severs women from the informal networks through which they exercised influence. Sexualised harassment in public space, and the family responses it provokes, confine women to the home. Surveillance, harassment and detention constrain those who organise.



A woman with a suitcase passes beneath a closed road gate, West Bank. Photo: WATTAN Media Network.

At the same time, the same pressures have increased women's visible public responsibilities. Because men face concentrated risks of detention and targeted violence, women in communities including Mu'arrajat East, Umm al-Khair, Susiya and Masafer Yatta have taken on documenting violations, engaging directly with humanitarian and diplomatic actors, and organising community protection responses.¹¹⁹ Palestinian women are therefore simultaneously more exposed as documenters and advocates and less protected in that role. Chapter III addresses what happens to the organisations and defenders who do this work.

¹¹⁹ Banks and Nazzari, *Sexual Violence and Forcible Transfer in the West Bank*, April 2026, "Protection and Community Life After Relocation", p. 17.

CHAPTER



A night access raid in Susiya, West Bank, 1 September 2025. Photo: Mediterranean Saving Humans / Wikimedia Commons, CC0.


Restrictions on Women's Organisations, Defenders and Accountability

This chapter treats the narrowing of civic space as part of the protection and accountability analysis rather than as a separate subject. The organisations and individuals described here are the same ones that deliver gender-based violence responses, protection referrals, legal aid and reproductive-health services in the communities described in Chapters I and II; that document the violations on which UN mechanisms and this report rely; and through which survivors reach international accountability processes. Restricting them is therefore not only an interference with freedom of association. It removes protection.

IN THIS CHAPTER

- 01** Targeting and delegitimisation of Palestinian civil society
- 02** Funding and registration restrictions
- 03** Effects on women's rights organisations and service delivery
- 04** Surveillance, detention and harassment of women human-rights defenders
- 05** Digital censorship, advocacy and documentation



FIGURE 14
The closing of civic space: a timeline, 2020–2026


Red markers indicate the detention of women human-rights defenders and health professionals.

Source: Compiled by PWWSO from the sources cited in Chapter III.

Targeting and delegitimisation of Palestinian civil society

The 2021 designations

On 19 October 2021 Israel's Minister of Defence designated six Palestinian human-rights and civil-society organisations as "terrorist organisations" under Israel's Counter-Terrorism Law (2016): Ad-dameer, Al-Haq, the Bisan Center for Research and Development, Defence for Children International – Palestine, the Union of Agricultural Work Committees and the Union of Palestinian Women's Committees.¹²⁰ On 3 November 2021 the Israeli military commander gave the designation effect in the occupied West Bank by declaring the six organisations "unlawful associations" under Regulation 84(1) (b) of the Defence (Emergency) Regulations 1945.¹²¹

¹²⁰ Adalah – The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel, "Israel's declaration of 6 Palestinian human rights groups as 'terrorist organizations'", case page, 30 December 2021. <https://www.adalah.org/en/content/view/10508>

¹²¹ Front Line Defenders, statement, "OPT/Israel: Front Line Defenders strongly condemns Israeli security force raids and closures of the offices of seven Palestinian human rights organisations", 18 August 2022 (military order of 3 November 2021 under Regulation 84(1)(b) of the Defence (Emergency) Regulations 1945). <https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/en/statement-report/statement-opt-israel-raids-and-closures-seven-palestinian-human-rights-organisations>

The designation carries severe legal and financial consequences: it authorises the closure of offices, the seizure of assets and the arrest of staff, and it prohibits funding or the public expression of support for the organisations' activities. Israel alleged that the six were fronts for the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. The organisations have consistently denied the allegation, and Israeli authorities have never substantiated it publicly. When the organisations' lawyers formally demanded disclosure of the evidence, the Military Attorney replied that the core of the designations rests on classified material that would remain secret — leaving the organisations without any means of contesting it.¹²² Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International described the decision as “an attack by the Israeli government on the international human rights movement”.¹²³

On 18 August 2022 Israeli forces raided, vandalised and sealed the offices of seven Palestinian organisations — the six designated bodies together with the Health Work Committees — confiscating documents and equipment and issuing closure orders.¹²⁴

Al-Haq responded by writing formally to the European Union and other third States, calling on them to condemn the designation as an internationally wrongful act, to instruct banks and financial institutions under their jurisdiction to treat the designation as inapplicable, and to press Israel to repeal the 2016 Counter-Terrorism Law as incompatible with basic human-rights standards.¹²⁵ That appeal identifies the central financial mechanism at stake. Because Palestinian civil-society organisations depend on international donor funding, a terrorism designation threatens to sever funding channels even in States that reject the designation's legitimacy, because banks and financial intermediaries commonly decline to process transactions connected to designated entities in order to limit their own legal exposure.¹²⁶

Delegitimisation campaigns

The designations were preceded and accompanied by sustained campaigns by Israeli organisations, notably NGO Monitor, which publish profiles connecting named Palestinian civil-society figures and organisations to the PFLP. PWWS's position is that the organisations concerned are engaged in documenting violations, providing legal assistance, protecting civilians and supporting ICC processes, and that campaigns of this kind operate to delegitimise and criminalise lawful human-rights work rather than to establish any factual proposition capable of testing.

The pattern is illustrated by the treatment of Al-Haq's General Director, Shawan Jabarin. On 21 August 2021 Al-Haq published an account of telephone calls he received from a person identifying himself as an officer of the Israeli security service, who accused him of PFLP membership and Al-Haq of PFLP ties; Jabarin described the accusations as fabrications directed at Palestinian civil-society organisa-

¹²² Adalah – The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel, press release, “Israel refuses to reveal the evidence against the six Palestinian organizations it has designated as ‘terrorist organizations’”, 6 January 2022. <https://www.adalah.org/en/content/view/10515>

¹²³ Human Rights Watch, news release, “Israel/Palestine: Designation of Palestinian Rights Groups as Terrorists”, 22 October 2021 (joint statement with Amnesty International). <https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/10/22/israel/palestine-designation-palestinian-rights-groups-terrorists>

¹²⁴ Front Line Defenders, statement, 18 August 2022 (raids on, and closure of, the offices of seven Palestinian organisations, including the Health Work Committees). <https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/en/statement-report/statement-opt-israel-raids-and-closures-seven-palestinian-human-rights-organisations>

¹²⁵ Al-Haq, “Al-Haq Calls on Third States to Publicly Condemn and Call for the Full Rescinding of Israel's Designation of Palestinian Human Rights NGOs as ‘Terrorist Organisations’”, 24 October 2021. <https://www.alhaq.org/advocacy/19050.html>

¹²⁶ United Nations, Meetings Coverage, “Outraged over Israel's Designation of Six Civil Society Groups as Terrorists, Speakers Tell Palestinian Rights Committee Harassment against Human Rights Defenders Must End”, GA/PAL/1443, 7 December 2021. <https://press.un.org/en/2021/gapal1443.doc.htm>

tions and human-rights defenders. Al-Haq characterised the calls as part of a pattern of harassment and threats used to intimidate defenders rather than as a legitimate security matter.¹²⁷ Jabarin has been elected Vice-President of the International Federation for Human Rights.¹²⁸

The same campaigns have targeted women leaders. NGO Monitor has profiled Khitam Saafin, president of the Union of Palestinian Women's Committees. The World Organisation Against Torture assessed that Saafin was targeted by the Israeli occupation authorities, as many others have been, solely as a result of her peaceful and legitimate work in defence of human rights, and described her detention as part of a policy of silencing those who oppose the policies of the occupation.¹²⁹

Freedom of expression under Article 19 ICCPR is not absolute, and Article 20(2) requires States to prohibit advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred constituting incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence. The threshold distinguishing prohibited incitement from protected speech is set out in the Rabat Plan of Action, which assesses context, speaker, intent, content, extent and likelihood of harm.¹³⁰ Where campaigns directed at Palestinian women human-rights defenders generate foreseeable risks of violence and are not met with the due-diligence response required by Article 4(c) DEVAW, PWWSO's assessment is that this constitutes a distinct State failure, additional to the direct restrictions described below.

Funding and registration restrictions

Sanctions imposed by third States

Financial pressure has escalated beyond Israel's domestic framework. In June 2025 the United States added Addameer to the Treasury Department's Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List. On 4 September 2025 the Secretary of State designated three further Palestinian organisations — Al-Haq, the Al-Mezan Center for Human Rights and the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights — under Executive Order 14203, an order originally directed at the International Criminal Court itself. The designation freezes any assets the organisations hold within US jurisdiction and prohibits US persons and institutions from engaging with them financially or otherwise. The State Department stated that the organisations "have directly engaged in efforts by the International Criminal Court (ICC) to investigate, arrest, detain, or prosecute Israeli nationals, without Israel's consent".¹³¹

The three organisations described the sanctions as an attempt to entrench Israel's unlawful occupation, and called on third States to condemn Executive Order 14203 as an internationally wrongful act and to invoke the EU Blocking Statute to shield Palestinian human-rights organisations from its reach.¹³²

¹²⁷ Al-Haq, statement, "Urgent Action Needed: General Director of Al-Haq Receives a Threatening Phone Call from Israeli Intelligence, the Shabak", 21 August 2021. <https://www.alhaq.org/advocacy/20459.html>

¹²⁸ Al-Haq, "Al-Haq Director Shawan Jabarin elected Vice-President of the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH)", 28 May 2013. <https://www.alhaq.org/advocacy/6750.html>

¹²⁹ World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT), urgent intervention, "Administrative detention of Palestinian human rights defender Khitam Al-Saafin", 17 January 2021. <https://www.omct.org/en/resources/urgent-interventions/administrative-detention-of-palestinian-human-rights-defender-khitam-al-saafin>

¹³⁰ OHCHR, *Rabat Plan of Action on the prohibition of advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence*, A/HRC/22/17/Add.4, 2012. <https://www.ohchr.org/en/freedom-of-expression/rabat-plan-of-action>

¹³¹ United States Department of State, press statement of the Secretary of State, "Sanctioning Foreign NGOs Directly Engaged in ICC's Illegitimate Targeting of Israel", 4 September 2025. <https://www.state.gov/releases/2025/09/sanctioning-foreign-ngos-directly-engaged-in-iccs-illegitimate-targeting-of-israel/>

¹³² Al-Haq, Al-Mezan Center for Human Rights and the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights, joint press release, 5 September 2025. <https://www.alhaq.org/advocacy/26662.html>

The United Nations response was direct. On 5 September 2025 the High Commissioner for Human Rights called the sanctions completely unacceptable and said they should be withdrawn, warning of a chilling effect on civil society in the OPT and Israel and potentially globally.¹³³ On 22 September 2025 UN experts said the sanctions were alarming and represented “a direct attack on international justice”, described the three organisations as among the oldest, most effective and most reliable in covering human-rights violations and abuses by all parties in the OPT, and warned that “[s]anctioning organisations for denouncing human rights violations is a blatant violation of the rights to freedom of expression and association”.¹³⁴ In a joint statement issued in October 2025, Human Rights Watch and dozens of co-signatories warned that the sanctions create a chilling effect on humanitarian and human-rights work and undermine the ability of civil-society actors to pursue accountability under international law.¹³⁵

Registration requirements for international organisations

On 9 December 2024 the IOP announced the creation of an inter-ministerial team, headed by the Ministry of Diaspora Affairs and Combating Antisemitism, to register international NGOs whose principal humanitarian activities serve Palestinians, linking registration to recommendations for visas and work permits for foreign staff. The stated purposes were to update the registration mechanism and address security risks; the decision also provided for applications to be refused where an organisation or its activities were considered connected to boycotting or delegitimising Israel, or to prohibited organisations.¹³⁶

Registration guidelines were published on 9 March 2025 and updated on 14 September 2025. They require detailed information on an organisation, its budget, donors and work plan, together with a list of all personnel involved in management and implementation — **including Palestinian employees, with full names, identification or passport numbers and contact details** — and empower the inter-ministerial team to refuse or revoke registration, or to deny work-permit recommendations, on grounds including public or State security and alleged links to delegitimation, boycotts or prohibited organisations.¹³⁷

On 30 December 2025, 37 international organisations were notified that their registrations would expire on 31 December, triggering a 60-day period after which they would be required to cease operations in Gaza and the West Bank including East Jerusalem.¹³⁸ The affected organisations stated that transferring personal information about Palestinian employees to a party to the conflict would expose staff and their families to serious risk and would breach data-protection obligations in their countries of domicile as well as the humanitarian principles of neutrality, independence and non-dis-

¹³³ OHCHR, press release, “Türk calls on the US to withdraw sanctions against Palestinian rights groups”, 5 September 2025. <https://www.un.org/unispal/document/ohchr-press-release-05sep25/>

¹³⁴ OHCHR, press release, “UN experts dismayed by US sanctions against Palestinian human rights organisations”, 22 September 2025. <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/09/un-experts-dismayed-us-sanctions-against-palestinian-human-rights>

¹³⁵ Human Rights Watch and co-signatories, joint statement, “US Sanctions on Palestinian Human Rights Organizations Erode International Law”, 17 October 2025. <https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/10/17/joint-statement-us-sanctions-on-palestinian-human-rights-organizations-erodes>

¹³⁶ Government of Israel, Prime Minister's Office and Ministry of Diaspora Affairs and Combating Antisemitism, joint statement, 9 December 2024. <https://www.gov.il/en/pages/spoke-common091224>

¹³⁷ Ministry of Diaspora Affairs and Combating Antisemitism, *Guidelines for the Registration of Organizations and Issuance of Recommendations for Their Foreign Employees* (international non-governmental organisations primarily engaged in activities with Palestinian residents for the purpose of humanitarian aid), issued 9 March 2025, updated 14 September 2025. https://www.gov.il/en/pages/interministerial_team_registration_humanitarian_organizations_foreign_employees

¹³⁸ Joint statement of 53 international non-governmental organisations, “Israel's recent registration measures will impede critical humanitarian action”, January 2026. <https://www.nrc.no/news/2026/53-international-ngos-warn-israels-recent-registration-measures-will-impede-critical-humanitarian-action>


crimination.¹³⁹ In a joint statement in May 2025, 55 organisations had already described the rules as broad, vague and politicised, warning that they could make registration conditional on political alignment and obstruct humanitarian assistance.¹⁴⁰

More than fifteen organisations petitioned Israel's Supreme Court. On 27 February 2026 the Court issued a temporary interim order permitting the organisations to continue operating pending judgment.¹⁴¹ On 19 May 2026 a panel headed by the Chief Justice rejected the petitions, holding that the requirement to provide information on local employees was a limited and proportionate security measure, and granting the applicants a final 30-day period in which to submit complete applications; organisations that failed to do so would be required to cease operations.¹⁴²

The 37 organisations are listed at Annex 1. PWWSO draws the Committee's attention to their composition. They include the principal providers of sexual and reproductive health care, maternal health services, gender-based violence response, child protection and psychosocial support in the OPT – among them Médecins Sans Frontières (four sections), Médecins du Monde (two), Médicos del Mundo, Medical Aid for Palestinians, the International Rescue Committee, ActionAid, Terre des Hommes, War Child Holland and the Norwegian Refugee Council. The joint statement warned that deregistration would result in the immediate closure of roughly one in three health facilities.¹⁴³ The gendered consequence is direct: the services most likely to be lost are those for which no alternative provider exists in rural Area C, and which women cannot substitute by travelling, because travel is the thing the obstacle régime prevents.

FIGURE 15

37 international organisations notified of deregistration on 30 December 2025



● 13 organisations whose fields include sexual and reproductive health, maternal health, GBV response or protection of women and girls ● other fields. Numbers refer to Annex 1.

The affected organisations warned that deregistration would close roughly one in three health facilities.

Source: Joint statement of affected organisations; Annex 1 of this report.

¹³⁹ Joint statement of 53 international non-governmental organisations, "Israel's recent registration measures will impede critical humanitarian action", January 2026. <https://www.nrc.no/news/2026/53-international-ngos-warn-israels-recent-registration-measures-will-impede-critical-humanitarian-action>

¹⁴⁰ ReliefWeb, "Israel's new INGO registration measures are a grave threat to humanitarian operations and international law, 55 organisations say", joint statement, 6 May 2025. <https://reliefweb.int/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/israels-new-ingo-registration-measures-are-grave-threat-humanitarian-operations-and-international-law-55-organisations-say-6-may-2025>

¹⁴¹ Agence France-Presse, "Israel Supreme Court freezes foreign aid organisations' Gaza ban", 27 February 2026 (temporary interim order on the petition of more than a dozen international NGOs).

¹⁴² Adalah – The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel, press release, "Israeli Supreme Court decision upholding restrictive registration requirements on international humanitarian organizations is a further fatal blow to Palestinians", 25 May 2026 (judgment of 19 May 2026). <https://www.adalah.org/en/content/view/11624>

¹⁴³ Joint statement of 53 international non-governmental organisations, "Israel's recent registration measures will impede critical humanitarian action", January 2026. <https://www.nrc.no/news/2026/53-international-ngos-warn-israels-recent-registration-measures-will-impede-critical-humanitarian-action>

Effects on women's rights organisations and service delivery

The designation of the Union of Palestinian Women's Committees illustrates how these measures operate specifically against women's organisations. The UPWC is a grassroots women's rights organisation founded in 1980. Its president, Khitam Saafin, was seized from her home in Beitunia on 2 November 2020 and placed in administrative detention — imprisonment without charge or trial — on the basis of secret evidence never disclosed to her or her lawyer. The order was renewed until an indictment was filed in June 2021. In February 2022 the Ofer Military Court sentenced her to 16 months' imprisonment and a fine, and she was released in May 2022 after eighteen months in detention, on condition that she not resume her human-rights work, with a further five-month sentence suspended for three years on the same condition.¹⁴⁴

The practical result is that the president of a national women's organisation was imprisoned, the organisation was outlawed, its funding channels were placed at risk, and its leader was prohibited on pain of imprisonment from returning to the work. PWWSO's assessment is that the protection, referral and documentation capacity lost in this way is not replaced: it is removed from the communities described in Chapters I and II, precisely where sexual and gender-based violence is most severely under-reported and where no other complaint mechanism is accessible.

A parallel case concerns health services. Shatha Odeh, then 60, had directed the Health Work Committees, a Palestinian non-profit healthcare provider operating clinic across the West Bank, including services for women and girls in remote areas. On 7 July 2021, at about 2 a.m., between fifteen and twenty Israeli soldiers entered her home in Ramallah without a warrant and detained her; she was held for nineteen days before charges were filed on 26 July 2021 alleging that she held a position in an unlawful association, participated in events connected to it, and unlawfully received funds for it. On 12 May 2022 the Ofer Military Court sentenced her to 16 months' imprisonment and a fine of approximately US\$9,000, together with a five-year suspended sentence conditional on her ceasing to provide health services. She was released on 3 June 2022 and was barred from resuming her position.^{145 146 147}

The condition attached to Ms Odeh's release is significant in its own right. A measure that bars a named woman from providing healthcare for five years is a restriction not only on her but on the women and girls who would have received those services.

Surveillance, detention and harassment of women human-rights defenders

Women human-rights defenders in the West Bank report increased targeting through surveillance, arbitrary detention and ill-treatment.¹⁴⁸ Two recent cases illustrate the methods.

¹⁴⁴ Front Line Defenders, case update, "Woman human rights defender Khitam Saafin released after 18 months of imprisonment on condition of not continuing her human rights work", 3 June 2022. <https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/en/case/woman-human-rights-defender-khitam-saafin-released-after-18-months-imprisonment-condition-not>

¹⁴⁵ International Commission of Jurists, press statement, "Israel: immediately release human rights defender Shatha Odeh and stop crackdown on Palestinian civil society", 2 September 2021 (circumstances of the arrest of 7 July 2021 and the charges filed on 26 July 2021). <https://www.icj.org/israel-immediately-release-human-right-defender-shatha-odeh-and-stop-crackdown-on-palestinian-civil-society/>

¹⁴⁶ OHCHR, "Women fight the push back of their rights in the occupied Palestinian territory", 2022 (release of Shatha Odeh on 3 June 2022 and the order that she cease working for the Health Work Committees). <https://www.un.org/unispal/document/women-fight-the-push-back-of-their-rights-in-the-opt-ohchr-article/>

¹⁴⁷ Peoples Dispatch, "Palestinian health activist Shatha Odeh released from Israeli imprisonment", 3 June 2022 (sentence of 12 May 2022: 16 months' imprisonment, fine of approximately US\$9,000 and a five-year suspended sentence conditional on not providing health services). <https://peoplesdispatch.org/2022/06/03/palestinian-health-activist-shatha-odeh-released-from-israeli-imprisonment/>

Tahreer Jaber. A Palestinian human-rights defender and feminist activist and a member of the General Union of Palestinian Women, Ms Jaber was detained at 4 a.m. on 17 September 2024 at her home in Beitunia, Ramallah. Officers checked her and her husband's identity documents; a female soldier took her into a room and searched her without giving any reason or presenting a warrant. Her hands were then tied behind her back with plastic cuffs and she was blindfolded before being transported to what she believed to be the Beit El compound outside Ramallah, where detainees were held for about ten hours in a dirty waiting room. She was transferred to Ofer prison and, on 18 September, to Damon prison, where detainees were strip-searched on arrival. On 29 September 2024 she was placed in administrative detention, without charge or trial, running from 24 September 2024 to 16 January 2025, on the stated ground that she posed a threat to Israeli security.^{149 150}

Dr Dima Mohammed Amin. A 55-year-old Palestinian obstetrician and gynaecologist from Ramallah, Dr Amin was arrested during a night raid on her home in the al-Tira neighbourhood on 18 August 2026. Her hands were bound tightly with plastic restraints and she was blindfolded. Neither her family nor her lawyer was informed of her whereabouts for approximately 36 hours. During her transfer she suffered a medical emergency and was taken to hospital in Jerusalem, where she underwent cardiac catheterisation before being returned to interrogation. Her lawyer told the military court that soldiers had tightened her restraints despite her requests and that marks were visible on her wrists after hospitalisation. On 20 August the Ofer Military Court extended her detention for five days on allegations of incitement through social media; on 21 August she was moved to solitary confinement at the Moscobiya detention and interrogation centre, in a windowless cell that initially contained no mattress, with an Arabic-style toilet without access to water, and she was prohibited from keeping her prescription glasses. Her detention was extended again on 24 and 25 August. On 27 August 2026 the military prosecution filed an indictment alleging incitement through social media and support for a terrorist organisation, based on posts attributed to her Facebook account, and requested her detention until the conclusion of proceedings; the court postponed consideration and listed a hearing for 2 September 2026.^{151 152} Her lawyer told the court that the file contained around 100 posts, of which 38 had been read to her during interrogation and the remainder had not been translated.¹⁵³ Médecins Sans Frontières described her arrest as part of a systematic campaign of pursuing and detaining Palestinian medical personnel.¹⁵⁴

¹⁴⁸ OHCHR, "On the brink: Women in the Occupied Palestinian Territory", March 2025 (UNFPA figure of 73,000 pregnant women in the West Bank; killing of Sondos Shalabi; increased targeting of women human-rights defenders). <https://www.ohchr.org/en/stories/2025/03/brink-women-occupied-palestinian-territory>

¹⁴⁹ World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT), urgent intervention, "Israel/Occupied Palestinian Territory: Arbitrary arrest, ill-treatment and abusive administrative detention of WHRD Tahreer Jaber", ISR 001/1124/OBS 045, 8 November 2024. <https://www.omct.org/en/resources/urgent-interventions/israel-occupied-palestinian-territory-arbitrary-arrest-ill-treatment-and-abusive-administrative-detention-of-whrd-tahreer-jaber>

¹⁵⁰ International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders, urgent appeal, "Israel/OPT: Arbitrary arrest, ill-treatment and abusive administrative detention of WHRD Tahreer Jaber", 8 November 2024 (administrative detention order of 29 September 2024 running from 24 September 2024 to 16 January 2025). <https://www.fidh.org/en/issues/human-rights-defenders/israel-opt-arbitrary-arrest-ill-treatment-and-abusive-administrative>

¹⁵¹ Addameer Prisoner Support and Human Rights Association, "Military Court Extends Detention of Dr. Dima Amin Until Tomorrow, Tuesday", 24 August 2026 (arrest of 18 August 2026; conditions of detention at the Moscobiya centre; extension of 20 August 2026). <https://addameer.ps/news/5708>

¹⁵² Addameer Prisoner Support and Human Rights Association, "Indictment Filed Against Dr. Dima Amin and Hearing on Her Detention Pending Trial Postponed", 27 August 2026. <https://addameer.ps/news/5727>

¹⁵³ Washington Center for Human Rights, "Israeli Court Extends Detention of Palestinian Doctor Despite Heart Attack", 24 August 2026 (submissions of counsel regarding restraints, the number of posts in the file and the absence of translation). <https://washingtoncentre.org/israeli-court-extends-detention-of-palestinian-doctor-despite-heart-attack-a-human-rights-crisis/>

¹⁵⁴ Middle East Monitor, "Israeli court extends detention of Palestinian doctor despite heart catheterisation", 24 August 2026 (statement of Médecins Sans Frontières). <https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20260824-israeli-court-extends-detention-of-palestinian-doctor-despite-heart-catheterisation/>

Dr Amin's case connects the two halves of this report. She is a woman human-rights defender; she is also an obstetrician and gynaecologist in a territory where, as Chapter II records, only 42 per cent of health facilities are fully operational and more than 230,000 women and girls have limited or no access to reproductive health services.

Articles 21 and 22 ICCPR protect peaceful assembly and association, and permit restrictions only where provided by law, necessary in a democratic society for a legitimate aim, and proportionate. Administrative detention without charge or trial on the basis of undisclosed evidence engages Article 9 ICCPR and, where treatment reaches the relevant severity threshold, the prohibition of torture and of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. The 1998 UN Declaration on Human Rights Defenders affirms the right of everyone, individually and in association with others, to promote and protect human rights, and the corresponding State duty to protect defenders from violence, threats, retaliation and arbitrary restriction.¹⁵⁵

Digital censorship, advocacy and documentation


Digital platforms are a primary channel through which Palestinian women's organisations publish documentation, reach survivors, raise funds and conduct advocacy, and through which women human-rights defenders communicate when movement restrictions prevent physical assembly. Restrictions on that channel therefore bear directly on documentation and accountability.

During 2025, 7amleh — the Arab Center for the Advancement of Social Media — documented 3,452 digital rights violations against Palestinians and their supporters, including 538 platform-censorship complaints submitted through its 7or observatory and 2,910 documented cases of hate speech and incitement.¹⁵⁶ Its analysis concludes that what Palestinians face is no longer confined to the removal of a post or the suspension of an account, but has become a structure of control integrating legislation, digital policing, cross-border political pressure, automated enforcement and AI-powered surveillance, which restricts expression, reinforces self-censorship and excludes Palestinian voices from the digital public sphere.¹⁵⁷

¹⁵⁵ Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, UN General Assembly resolution 53/144, 9 December 1998. <https://www.ohchr.org/en/special-procedures/sr-human-rights-defenders/declaration-human-rights-defenders>

¹⁵⁶ 7amleh – The Arab Center for the Advancement of Social Media, *Hashtag Palestine 2025: Digital Repression as a System Governed by Law, Political Pressure, and Algorithms*, annual report, 18 February 2026. <https://7amleh.org/post/hashtag-palestine-2025-en>

¹⁵⁷ 7amleh – The Arab Center for the Advancement of Social Media, *Hashtag Palestine 2025: Digital Repression as a System Governed by Law, Political Pressure, and Algorithms*, annual report, 18 February 2026. <https://7amleh.org/post/hashtag-palestine-2025-en>

FIGURE 16
Digital-rights violations against Palestinians
DOCUMENTED IN 2025

INCORRECT REMOVALS ACKNOWLEDGED BY META


Source: 7amleh, *Hashtag Palestine 2025* (18 February 2026); *The Platformicide of Palestine (2021–2025)* (9 June 2026).

Research published in June 2026 by 7amleh with Dr Fabio Cristiano of Utrecht University analysed 3,520 cases submitted to the 7or observatory between 2021 and 2025 and documented patterns of censorship and suppression of Palestinian content across Meta's platforms over that period.¹⁵⁸ A fuller account of documented platform conduct, with sources, is provided at Annex 2.

Two consequences matter for this report's purposes. First, the asymmetry: Palestinian civic, journalistic and humanitarian expression is disproportionately restricted while content inciting violence against Palestinians circulates with comparatively less moderation. Second, the effect on documentation: where posts recording violations are removed and accounts suspended, the evidentiary record on which UN mechanisms, courts and reports such as this one depend is degraded. Arbitrary detention on the basis of social-media posts — as in Dr Amin's case — compounds this by making documentation and public commentary personally dangerous.

Online expression is protected under Article 19 ICCPR, as confirmed by Human Rights Committee General Comment No. 34, which extends the protection to all forms of electronic and internet-based expression.¹⁵⁹ Surveillance of Palestinian digital activity engages the right to privacy under Article 17 ICCPR. Asymmetric content moderation engages the responsibilities of platforms themselves under the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights to respect human rights, to conduct human-rights due diligence and to provide access to effective remedy.¹⁶⁰

¹⁵⁸ 7amleh – The Arab Center for the Advancement of Social Media, with Dr Fabio Cristiano (Utrecht University), *The Platformicide of Palestine (2021–2025): A Data-Based Analysis of Meta's Policy Application, Moderation Enforcement, and Communication*, 9 June 2026. <https://7amleh.org/post/meta-suppression-of-palestinian-content-en>

¹⁵⁹ Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 34 on Article 19: Freedoms of opinion and expression, CCPR/C/GC/34, 12 September 2011, para. 12. <https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/general-comments-and-recommendations/general-comment-no-34-article-19-freedoms-opinion-and>

¹⁶⁰ OHCHR, *Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations "Protect, Respect and Remedy" Framework*, HR/PUB/11/04, 2011. <https://www.ohchr.org/en/publications/reference-publications/guiding-principles-business-and-human-rights>

CHAPTER

IV

A settlement spread across a hilltop above terraced Palestinian land, West Bank. Photo: WATTAN Media Network.

Consolidated Legal Findings

This chapter consolidates the legal analysis that would otherwise be repeated across Chapters I to III. It distinguishes between findings made by competent judicial bodies, findings made by United Nations mechanisms and other named organisations, and PWWSD's own legal characterisation. Where a characterisation depends on contextual elements or evidentiary thresholds that no competent body has yet determined, that is stated.

IN THIS CHAPTER

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| 01 Findings of the International Court of Justice | 04 Characterisations under international criminal law |
| 02 Applicable rules of international humanitarian law | 05 State responsibility and reparation |
| 03 Applicable rules of international human rights law | |



FIGURE 17
Four bodies of law engaged by the documented conduct

IHL International humanitarian law ■ GC IV Arts 27, 49(1), 49(6), 55–56 ■ Hague Regs Arts 43, 46, 52, 55 ■ Customary IHL Rules 90, 93	IHRL International human rights law ■ ICCPR · ICESCR · CRC ■ CEDAW Arts 7–14; GR 24, 30, 35 ■ DEVAW Art 4(c) due diligence ■ UNSCR 1325 · 1820 · 2122	ICL International criminal law ■ Rome Statute Art 8(2)(b) (viii) ■ Arts 7(1)(d), 7(1)(g), 7(1)(h) ■ Art 8(2)(b)(xxii)	ICJ & ARSIWA Judicial findings and State responsibility ■ Advisory Opinions 2004 & 2024 ■ Non-recognition & non-assistance ■ Cessation and full reparation
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Source: PWWSO legal analysis, Chapter IV.

Findings of the International Court of Justice

In its Advisory Opinion of 9 July 2004 the Court found that the construction of the wall in the occupied Palestinian territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, and its associated régime are contrary to international law; that the route, in so far as it departs from the Green Line, together with the gate and permit régime, impedes the liberty of movement guaranteed by Article 12 ICCPR and the exercise of the rights to work, health, education and an adequate standard of living under the ICESCR; and that those impediments could not be justified by military exigency or the requirements of national security or public order.¹⁶¹

In its Advisory Opinion of 19 July 2024 the Court found, in summary and with the paragraph references indicated:

- 1 that the transfer by Israel of settlers to the West Bank and East Jerusalem, and the maintenance of their presence, is contrary to Article 49(6) GC IV (paras. 115–119);
- 2 that Israel's land policies are not in conformity with Articles 46, 52 and 55 of the Hague Regulations (paras. 120–123);
- 3 that Israel's policies and practices — including forcible evictions, extensive house demolitions and restrictions on residence and movement — often leave members of the Palestinian population in Area C with no choice but to leave, and are contrary to the prohibition of forcible transfer of the protected population under Article 49(1) GC IV; and that transfer may be forcible not only where physical force is used but also where the people concerned have no genuine choice but to leave (paras. 142–147);

¹⁶¹ International Court of Justice, *Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory*, Advisory Opinion, 9 July 2004, I.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 136. <https://www.icj-cij.org/case/131>

- 4 that **Israel's systematic failure to prevent or to punish attacks by settlers against the life or bodily integrity of Palestinians, as well as its excessive use of force against Palestinians, is inconsistent with its obligations**, and that settler violence and that failure contribute to the creation and maintenance of a coercive environment (paras. 148–154);
- 5 that the settlements and the régime associated with them have been established and are being maintained in violation of international law (paras. 155–156);
- 6 that the régime of comprehensive restrictions imposed on Palestinians in the OPT constitutes systemic discrimination on grounds including race, religion or ethnic origin, in violation of Articles 2(1) and 26 ICCPR, Article 2(2) ICESCR and Article 2 ICERD; and that Israel's legislation and measures, which impose and maintain a near-complete separation between settler and Palestinian communities, breach Article 3 ICERD (paras. 180–229);
- 7 that Israel's continued presence in the OPT is unlawful; that Israel is under an obligation to bring it to an end as rapidly as possible, to cease immediately all new settlement activity, to evacuate all settlers and to make full reparation, including restitution and, where restitution is materially impossible, compensation (paras. 259–272, 285);
- 8 that **all States are under an obligation not to recognise as legal the situation arising from the unlawful presence of Israel in the OPT and not to render aid or assistance in maintaining the situation created by that continued presence**; that Member States are under an obligation not to recognise changes in the physical character, demographic composition, institutional structure or status of the territory occupied in 1967 and to distinguish in their dealings with Israel between Israel and the OPT; and that all States parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention have the obligation to ensure compliance by Israel with international humanitarian law as embodied in that Convention (paras. 273–279, 285); and
- 9 that international organisations, including the United Nations, are under the same obligation of non-recognition (paras. 280–283, 285).

Two points of precision are important. First, the Court's finding on third-State obligations is an obligation of **non-recognition and non-assistance**. The Court did not prescribe any particular sanction, embargo or trade measure. The measures recommended in the Recommendations section of this report are PWWSO's recommendations as to how States should give effect to those obligations; they are not themselves findings of the Court. Second, while the Court found a breach of Article 3 ICERD, it did not characterise Israel's conduct as apartheid, and one member of the Court recorded expressly that the Opinion cannot be understood as making such a finding because it did not address the specific intent element.¹⁶² Separate opinions by President Salam and Judge Tladi took the view that the discriminatory measures are tantamount to the crime of apartheid.¹⁶³ Where this report refers to apartheid, it does so by attribution to the body or authority making the assessment, and not as a finding of the Court.

¹⁶² International Court of Justice, Advisory Opinion, 19 July 2024, separate opinion of Judge Nolte (the Opinion cannot be understood as finding a violation of the prohibition of apartheid, given the absence of any discussion of specific intent). <https://www.icj-cij.org/case/186>

¹⁶³ International Court of Justice, Advisory Opinion, 19 July 2024, declaration of President Salam and declaration of Judge Tladi. <https://www.icj-cij.org/case/186>

Applicable rules of international humanitarian law

The following provisions are engaged by the conduct documented in Chapters I to III and are cited here once rather than repeated in each section.

Settlement and land. Article 49(6) GC IV (transfer of the occupying power's own civilian population); Articles 43, 46, 52 and 55 of the 1907 Hague Regulations (respect for the law in force; respect for private property; limits on requisition; the occupant's position as administrator and usufructuary of public property); Article 47 GC IV (protected persons may not be deprived of the Convention's protections by annexation or by changes to the institutions or government of the territory); Article 53 GC IV and Article 23(g) of the Hague Regulations (prohibition of destruction of property not rendered absolutely necessary by military operations).^{164 165}

Displacement. Article 49(1) GC IV prohibits individual or mass forcible transfers of protected persons from occupied territory, regardless of motive. The ICTY Appeals Chamber has held that "forcible" extends beyond physical force to situations of coercion, threat, fear of violence or abuse of power in which civilians have no genuine choice but to leave.¹⁶⁶ Article 147 GC IV lists unlawful deportation or transfer among the grave breaches.

Protection of women. Article 27(2) GC IV requires that women "shall be especially protected against any attack on their honour, in particular against rape, enforced prostitution, or any form of indecent assault". Articles 27 and 29 GC IV require humane treatment of protected persons and make the occupying power responsible for ensuring respect for the Convention. Customary international humanitarian law prohibits rape and other forms of sexual violence (Rule 93) and torture and cruel treatment (Rule 90).¹⁶⁷

Health, food and education. Article 55 GC IV requires the occupying power to ensure the food and medical supplies of the population to the fullest extent of the means available to it. Article 56 GC IV imposes the duty of ensuring and maintaining, with the cooperation of national and local authorities, medical and hospital establishments and services and public health and hygiene in the occupied territory. Article 50 GC IV requires the occupying power, with the cooperation of the national and local authorities, to facilitate the proper working of all institutions devoted to the care and education of children. Article 16 GC IV requires that expectant mothers be the object of particular protection and respect, and Article 17 provides for the evacuation of maternity cases from besieged or encircled areas.¹⁶⁸

Due process. Articles 64 GC IV and 43 of the Hague Regulations constrain the occupying power's authority to alter local penal law. Articles 71–76 GC IV set out the procedural guarantees applicable to protected persons in occupied territory. Sweeping counter-terrorism designations of civil-society

¹⁶⁴ Geneva Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 12 August 1949, Arts. 16, 17, 27, 29, 33, 47, 49, 50, 53, 55, 56, 64, 71–76 and 147. <https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/gciv-1949>

¹⁶⁵ Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, The Hague, 18 October 1907, Arts. 23(g), 43, 46, 52 and 55. <https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/hague-conv-iv-1907>

¹⁶⁶ International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, *Prosecutor v. Stakić*, Case No. IT-97-24-A, Appeals Judgment, 22 March 2006. <https://www.icty.org/en/case/stakic>

¹⁶⁷ International Committee of the Red Cross, *Customary International Humanitarian Law*, Volume I: Rules, Rules 90 and 93. <https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/customary-ihl/v1/rule93>

¹⁶⁸ Geneva Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 12 August 1949, Arts. 16, 17, 27, 29, 33, 47, 49, 50, 53, 55, 56, 64, 71–76 and 147. <https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/gciv-1949>

bodies that are not accompanied by individualised, judicially reviewable findings — and administrative detention on the basis of evidence withheld from the detainee and her lawyer — sit in direct tension with these provisions and with Articles 9 and 14 ICCPR.

Applicable rules of international human rights law

Substantive rights. ICESCR Articles 6, 7, 11, 12 and 13 protect the rights to work, just conditions of work, an adequate standard of living including food and water, health and education. ICCPR Articles 9, 12, 17, 19, 21 and 22 protect liberty of person, freedom of movement, privacy, expression, assembly and association. CRC Articles 24, 28 and 29 protect children's access to health care and education.

Women's rights. CEDAW Article 7 (public and political life), Article 8 (international representation), Article 10 (education), Article 11 (employment), Article 12 (health, including family planning and appropriate services in connection with pregnancy), Article 13 (economic and social life) and Article 14 (rural women's access to land, credit, marketing facilities and adequate living conditions) are engaged throughout. General Recommendation No. 30 requires States to assess the differentiated impact of conflict, occupation and territorial and resource-control measures on women, and calls on States to ensure that women's civil-society organisations can operate without undue restriction in conflict and occupation settings.¹⁶⁹ General Recommendation No. 35 reaffirms the due-diligence obligation to prevent, investigate, prosecute and punish gender-based violence, whether committed by State agents or by private persons, and addresses gender-based violence in conflict and occupation.¹⁷⁰ General Recommendation No. 24 elaborates State obligations regarding women's health, including where access is restricted.¹⁷¹

Due diligence. Article 4(c) DEVAW obliges States to exercise due diligence to prevent, investigate and punish acts of violence against women, whether perpetrated by the State or by private persons.¹⁷² The standard has its origin in *Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras*.¹⁷³ PWWSO's assessment is that this standard is directly applicable to the toleration by the IOP of settler violence against Palestinian women documented in Chapter I, and that the requirement is not satisfied where, as the CWRC records, 87 killings since 2019 have produced no effective prosecution and where, as the Court found in 2024, the failure to prevent or punish settler attacks is systematic.

Women, Peace and Security. UNSCR 1325 (2000) establishes the protection, participation, prevention and relief-and-recovery pillars; UNSCR 1820 (2008) addresses sexual violence in conflict and the combating of impunity; UNSCR 2122 (2013) calls for women's civil-society participation and for the protection of women human-rights defenders from reprisals.^{174 175 176}

¹⁶⁹ Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, General Recommendation No. 30 on women in conflict prevention, conflict and post-conflict situations, CEDAW/C/GC/30, 1 November 2013. <https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/general-comments-and-recommendations/general-recommendation-no-30-women-conflict>

¹⁷⁰ Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, General Recommendation No. 35 on gender-based violence against women, updating General Recommendation No. 19, CEDAW/C/GC/35, 26 July 2017. <https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/general-comments-and-recommendations/general-recommendation-no-35-gender-based-violence-against-women-updating>

¹⁷¹ Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, General Recommendation No. 24 on Article 12 (women and health), A/54/38/Rev.1, 1999. <https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/general-comments-and-recommendations/general-recommendation-no-24-article-12-convention>

¹⁷² Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, UN General Assembly resolution 48/104, 20 December 1993, Arts. 1 and 4(c). <https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/declaration-elimination-violence-against-women>

¹⁷³ Inter-American Court of Human Rights, *Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras*, Merits, Judgment of 29 July 1988, Series C No. 4, paras. 172–177. https://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_04_ing.pdf

¹⁷⁴ United Nations Security Council, resolution 1325 (2000), S/RES/1325 (31 October 2000). <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/426075>

¹⁷⁵ United Nations Security Council, resolution 1820 (2008), S/RES/1820 (19 June 2008). <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/629786>

Characterisations under international criminal law

PWWSO sets out below the legal characterisations engaged by the documented conduct. These are characterisations of patterns, not determinations of individual criminal responsibility, which is a matter for competent courts.

Transfer of population. The transfer, directly or indirectly, by the occupying power of parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies is listed as a war crime in international armed conflict by Article 8(2)(b)(viii) of the Rome Statute.¹⁷⁷ The factual predicate — the transfer and maintenance of settlers — has been established by the International Court of Justice.

Forcible transfer and deportation. Unlawful deportation or transfer of protected persons is a grave breach under Article 147 GC IV and a war crime under Article 8(2)(a)(vii) of the Rome Statute; deportation or forcible transfer of population is a crime against humanity under Article 7(1)(d) where committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population. On 29 January 2026 OHCHR stated that the forcible transfer of Palestinians within occupied territory constitutes a war crime and may amount to a crime against humanity.¹⁷⁸ In June 2026 Amnesty International concluded that the forcible displacement of Palestinian Bedouin and herding communities in Area C amounts to the war crime of unlawful deportation and transfer and to the crime against humanity of forcible transfer or deportation, and characterised the pattern as ethnic cleansing. That characterisation is Amnesty International's finding.¹⁷⁹

Sexual violence. Article 7(1)(g) of the Rome Statute lists rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilisation and any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity as crimes against humanity when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population; Articles 8(2)(b)(xxii) and 8(2)(e)(vi) list the equivalent war crimes. International jurisprudence has established that rape may constitute torture (*Furundžija*) and that rape and sexual enslavement may constitute crimes against humanity (*Kunarac*).^{180 181} The incidents recorded in Chapter II are documented through testimony and, in the consortium's assessment, substantially under-reported; PWWSO describes them as reported and documented allegations. Whether they meet the widespread-or-systematic threshold, and whether individual perpetrators bear criminal responsibility, are questions for the Office of the Prosecutor and the Court. PWWSO's position is that the pattern is sufficiently established to warrant investigation and that the conditions for it — impunity, the presence of State agents, and the documented use of sexualised conduct to induce departure — are themselves established.

Persecution. Article 7(1)(h) of the Rome Statute criminalises persecution against an identifiable group on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious or gender grounds, committed in connection with any other act referred to in Article 7(1) or any crime within the Court's jurisdiction.

¹⁷⁶ United Nations Security Council, resolution 2122 (2013), S/RES/2122 (18 October 2013). <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/759604>

¹⁷⁷ Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, Arts. 7(1)(d), 7(1)(g), 7(1)(h), 8(2)(a)(vii), 8(2)(b)(viii), 8(2)(b)(xxii) and 8(2)(e)(vi). <https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/2024-05/Rome-Statute-eng.pdf>

¹⁷⁸ Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, press release, "Settler violence drives forced displacement in the West Bank", 29 January 2026. <https://palestine.un.org/en/node/309094>

¹⁷⁹ Amnesty International, *Israel's Ethnic Cleansing of West Bank Bedouin and Herding Communities*, research report, 10 June 2026, sections "Settler violence as state policy" and "Conclusions and recommendations". <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/research/2026/06/israel-west-bank-ethnic-cleansing/>

¹⁸⁰ International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, *Prosecutor v. Anto Furundžija*, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Trial Judgment, 10 December 1998. <https://www.icty.org/en/case/furundzija>

¹⁸¹ International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, *Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovač and Vuković*, Case Nos. IT-96-23 and IT-96-23/1-A, Appeals Judgment, 12 June 2002. <https://www.icty.org/en/case/kunarac>

PWWSO submits that the systematic suppression of Palestinian civil society documented in Chapter III, and in particular the designation and dismantling of women's organisations and the prosecution of their leaders, is capable of constituting persecution on political and gender grounds. Whether it does so depends on the contextual elements of Article 7 — a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organisational policy — on the required nexus to another crime within the Court's jurisdiction, and on the applicable evidentiary thresholds. PWWSO does not assert that any competent body has made this finding, and asks that the question be examined.

Apartheid. Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, B'Tselem and successive UN Special Rapporteurs on the situation of human rights in the occupied Palestinian territory have concluded that Israel's treatment of Palestinians amounts to apartheid. As set out above, the International Court of Justice found a breach of Article 3 ICERD without characterising the conduct as apartheid; two members of the Court considered in separate opinions that the measures are tantamount to that crime. This report uses the term only with attribution to the authority making the assessment.

State responsibility and reparation

Where an internationally wrongful act is attributable to a State, that State is under an obligation to cease the conduct, to offer appropriate assurances and guarantees of non-repetition, and to make full reparation for the injury caused.¹⁸² The principle of full reparation — restitution, compensation and satisfaction — was articulated by the Permanent Court of International Justice in the *Factory at Chorzów* case and is reflected in the UN Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation.^{183 184} The 2024 Advisory Opinion applied that principle, holding that Israel is under an obligation to make reparation for the damage caused to all natural or legal persons concerned in the OPT.

PWWSO draws one gender-specific consequence from this. Restitution and compensation processes typically value registered property, formal employment and documented assets. The losses documented in Chapter II — dairy production, embroidery, foraging, beekeeping, herding labour, and the unpaid care work that expands when livelihoods collapse — are largely undocumented in those terms. Unless reparations mechanisms are explicitly designed to capture informal and home-based production, and unless claims data are sex-disaggregated, women will be systematically under-compensated for losses that the evidence shows they disproportionately bear.

¹⁸² International Law Commission, *Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts*, 2001, Arts. 30, 31, 40 and 41. https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft_articles/9_6_2001.pdf

¹⁸³ Permanent Court of International Justice, *Factory at Chorzów* (Germany v. Poland), Merits, Judgment No. 13, 13 September 1928, P.C.I.J. Series A, No. 17. https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/permanent-court-of-international-justice/serie_A/A_17/54_Usine_de_Chorzow_Fond_Arret.pdf

¹⁸⁴ Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, UN General Assembly resolution 60/147, 16 December 2005. <https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/basic-principles-and-guidelines-right-remedy-and-reparation>

FINDINGS

Conclusion



The evidence assembled in this report, drawn from judicial sources, United Nations agencies, Palestinian official bodies and established human-rights organisations, describes a set of mutually reinforcing policies rather than a series of isolated incidents.



Palestinians wait at a road gate at the entrance to a village, West Bank. **Photo: WATTAN Media Network.**

Accelerating settlement expansion and “state land” declarations remove land. Pastoral outposts convert that removal into permanent exclusion across 14 per cent of the West Bank. Settler violence, unprosecuted and frequently occurring in the presence of Israeli forces, makes remaining untenable. A movement-obstacle régime found unlawful in part by the International Court of Justice severs what remains of Palestinian communities from healthcare, education, markets and each other. And the deliberate narrowing of civic space disables the organisations positioned to document these harms, respond to them and seek redress.

Palestinian women sit at the intersection of every one of these tracks. They are direct targets of sexualised violence that has moved from public space into bedrooms, courtyards and latrines. They are the economic actors whose land-based and home-based production disappears first when access is lost — 87 per cent of women displaced from the communities studied lost all sources of income. They are the caregivers who absorb the consequences, supported at roughly one-fifth the rate at which children are supported. They are the mothers who cannot reach a hospital because only 42 per cent of facilities are fully operational and the roads are closed. They are the girls withdrawn from school or

married at fifteen so that a family can move them somewhere safer. And they are the defenders, directors and organisers of the civil-society sector now under sustained attack, imprisoned and then prohibited from returning to the work.

The most consequential single finding in this report is that, among displaced households, the inability to protect women and girls was the decisive reason for leaving in more than 70 per cent of cases. Sexualised violence in the West Bank is not only a violation in itself. It is functioning as an instrument of displacement.

“

Sexualised violence in the West Bank is not only a violation in itself. It is functioning as an instrument of displacement.

— PWWSO, Conclusion

The legal framework applicable to these findings is settled in its essentials. The occupation and its associated settlement régime are unlawful; Israel bears obligations of cessation, evacuation and full reparation; third States and international organisations bear independent obligations of non-recognition and non-assistance, and States parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention bear an obligation to ensure respect for it. What is not settled is implementation. Translating this legal clarity into protection for Palestinian women requires specific, coordinated action by three sets of actors, set out below.



ACTION POINTS

33

Recommendations

The recommendations below are organised by actor. Within each, they are grouped under four priorities: compliance with international law; protection and expansion of civic space; gender-responsive services and livelihoods; and accountability and access to justice.

ADDRESSED TO

- A** To the Palestinian Authority
- B** To third States, in particular States parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention and the Rome Statute
- C** To United Nations agencies and mechanisms



Overview

9

to the Palestinian Authority

WPS action plan, services for survivors, WHRD protection, reparations registry

14

to third States

3 legal obligations identified by the ICJ + 11 measures to give them effect

10

to UN agencies and mechanisms

sex-disaggregated monitoring, services, CRSV advisers, gender-sensitive reparation

Legal obligations are identified by the ICJ or by treaty. **PWWS recommendations** set out how to give effect to them.

Throughout, **legal obligations** are distinguished from **PWWS policy recommendations**. Where a recommendation gives effect to an obligation identified by the International Court of Justice or by a treaty, this is indicated; the choice of means is PWWS's recommendation and not a finding of any court.

A

To the Palestinian Authority

Recommendations 1–9

Compliance with international law

1

Continue and strengthen cooperation with the ICC's investigation in the Situation in the State of Palestine, including by transmitting the settlement, demolition, settler-violence and conflict-related sexual violence evidence referred to in this report, and by supporting victim participation procedures under the Rome Statute.

(Gives effect to obligations arising from Palestine's accession to the Rome Statute; the choice of evidentiary priorities is a PWWS recommendation, arising from Chapters I and II.)

2

Domesticate CEDAW and DEVAW standards in national legislation and administrative practice, including in the areas of PA-administered civil, land and family law that govern women's economic rights, inheritance and access to land.

(Treaty obligation under CEDAW Article 2; PWWS recommends prioritising land and inheritance provisions given the findings in Chapter II.)

Protection and expansion of civic space

3

Ensure that PA law and practice do not replicate the registration, funding or designation restrictions documented in Chapter III, and provide domestic legal protection and alternative registration pathways for women's rights organisations affected by external restrictions.

4

Establish, in coordination with OHCHR and UN Women, a protection mechanism for women human-rights defenders facing surveillance, incitement, harassment or detention, including emergency relocation support, legal representation and psychosocial care, and a designated focal point for defenders in detention.

Gender-responsive services and livelihoods

- 5 Adopt and cost an updated National Action Plan on UNSCR 1325, with dedicated and ring-fenced budget lines for rural, Bedouin and herding women and for young women's livelihoods in agriculture, and with indicators that track rural and displaced women rather than only urban and institutional participation.
- 6 Integrate reproductive-health continuity planning into Ministry of Health policy for communities affected by closures — pre-agreed referral pathways, midwife-led outreach, mobile clinics and the expansion of safe-motherhood centres in Area C — consistent with CEDAW Article 12 and GC IV Articles 16, 17 and 56.
- 7 Expand free legal aid, case management, shelter capacity and psychosocial support for survivors of settler and occupation-related gender-based violence, including in displacement sites, and ensure that referral pathways cover intimate-partner violence arising after displacement, which Chapter II documents as a recognised consequence of dispossession.
- 8 Design agricultural and livelihoods recovery programmes so that they reach women's asset-based and home-based production — dairy, embroidery, foraging, beekeeping and small livestock — rather than only registered landholders and formally employed farmers.

Accountability and access to justice

- 9 Maintain and publish a unified, chapter-referenced registry of land confiscation, demolition and settler violence, compatible with OCHA and national institutional datasets, with **sex-disaggregated records of loss**, to support future reparations claims consistent with the 2024 Advisory Opinion.

B

To third States, in particular States parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention and the Rome Statute

Recommendations 10–23

Legal obligations identified by the International Court of Justice and by treaty

- 10 **Do not recognise as legal** the situation arising from Israel's unlawful presence in the OPT, and **do not render aid or assistance** in maintaining it.
(Obligation identified by the ICJ, 2024 Advisory Opinion, paras. 278–279 and 285.)
- 11 **Distinguish in dealings with Israel** between the territory of the State of Israel and the Palestinian territory occupied since 1967, and do not recognise changes in the physical character, demographic composition, institutional structure or status of that territory.
(Obligation identified by the ICJ, 2024 Advisory Opinion, paras. 278 and 285.)
- 12 **Ensure respect** for the Fourth Geneva Convention by Israel, in accordance with Common Article 1.
(Obligation identified by the ICJ, 2024 Advisory Opinion, para. 279.)

PWWSO recommendations for giving effect to those obligations

- 13** Suspend the transfer of arms, parts, ammunition and dual-use items where there is a clear risk that they would be used in the commission of serious violations of international humanitarian or human rights law in the OPT, and publish the legal risk assessments on which such decisions are based, to the extent permitted by law.
- 14** Apply differentiated customs, trade and diplomatic treatment to settlement-linked goods, services and entities; exclude from public procurement, export credit and investment guarantees entities domiciled in, operating from, or materially supporting settlements and outposts; and assess “material support” against objective criteria including direct operational, financial or infrastructure contributions to settlement activity.
- 15** Impose targeted, lawful and proportionate measures against individuals and entities credibly implicated in settler violence, including those documented as involved in attacks that produced displacement, and ensure that such measures are not reversed without a change in the underlying conduct.
- 16** Require companies within their jurisdiction to conduct heightened human-rights due diligence in relation to activity connected to settlements, outposts and the OPT, consistent with the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, and provide effective access to remedy for those harmed.
- 17** Instruct financial institutions within their jurisdiction that Israel’s 2021 “terrorist” designations of Palestinian civil-society organisations, and third-State designations imposed in connection with cooperation with the ICC, have no legal effect in their jurisdiction, so that banking channels for Palestinian organisations are not severed by risk-aversion.
- 18** Provide direct, flexible, multi-year core funding to Palestinian women’s rights, protection and legal-aid organisations, structured so that it is not contingent on the registration or designation decisions of the occupying power or of any single donor State.
- 19** Do not require, as a condition of registration or operation, that humanitarian organisations transfer personal data on Palestinian staff to a party to the conflict, and support organisations that decline to do so.
- 20** Raise, publicly and in bilateral and multilateral human-rights dialogues, the cases of women human-rights defenders documented in Chapter III, including those held in administrative detention or prosecuted for online expression, and seek consular and trial observation access.
- 21** Exercise universal or extraterritorial jurisdiction, where domestic law permits, over grave breaches of GC IV and Rome Statute crimes connected to settlement expansion and to violence against Palestinian women.
- 22** Cooperate fully with the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC, including through information-sharing and funding, execute arrest warrants in accordance with Rome Statute obligations, and publicly reject measures that penalise organisations or individuals for cooperating with the Court.

- 23** Direct development and humanitarian assistance toward gender-responsive programming in agriculture, education continuity, reproductive health and GBV response in Area C and in Bedouin and herding communities, consistent with CEDAW Article 14 and the relief-and-recovery pillar of UNSCR 1325.

C

To United Nations agencies and mechanisms

Recommendations 24–33

Monitoring and reporting

- 24** Systematise joint reporting by OCHA, OHCHR, UN Women, UNFPA, UNCTAD and ESCWA against the specific obligations identified in the 2004 and 2024 Advisory Opinions, to support the Secretary-General's periodic reporting to the General Assembly, and **disaggregate by sex** the data on casualties, displacement, demolitions, access denial and loss of livelihood.
- 25** Expand OHCHR and special-procedures monitoring and public reporting on the targeting of Palestinian women's civil-society organisations, on funding and registration restrictions, and on digital-rights violations, including through direct communications to platforms regarding asymmetric content moderation and its effect on the documentation of violations.
- 26** Ensure that reporting on conflict-related sexual violence in the West Bank is sustained and specific, and that the annual report of the Secretary-General on conflict-related sexual violence reflects the patterns documented in Chapter II.

Protection, services and participation

- 27** Resource UN Women and UNFPA programming on gender-based violence prevention and response, reproductive-health continuity and economic empowerment for rural, Bedouin, herding and displaced women, including the expansion of safe-motherhood centres, mobile clinics, women and girls' safe spaces and confidential, survivor-centred reporting pathways.
- 28** Deploy dedicated conflict-related sexual violence advisers or focal points to high-risk communities in Area C to support safe documentation, survivor referral and pattern analysis, operating through established referral pathways and confidentiality protocols.
- 29** Ensure that women-led Palestinian organisations participate directly in humanitarian co-ordination structures, protection clusters and the design of displacement-prevention programming, rather than being consulted only as implementing partners.
- 30** Provide flexible, multi-year core funding to Palestinian women's rights organisations directly, to reduce their vulnerability to funding-restriction measures.

Accountability and reparation

- 31** Strengthen the evidentiary and documentation capacity of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry and of OHCHR's monitoring mechanisms so that gender-based violence findings meet the evidentiary thresholds required for ICC referral and for future reparations processes, including through the use of survivor-centred methodologies and secure evidence-handling protocols.
- 32** Ensure that any register of damage or future reparations mechanism arising from the 2024 Advisory Opinion accepts **gender-disaggregated claims**, and that its categories of recognised loss expressly include informal, home-based and unpaid production — dairy, embroidery, foraging, beekeeping and small livestock — and the loss of access to education, health care and community networks.
- 33** Support survivors' access to justice through funding for legal aid and accompaniment, and ensure that documented findings are published consistently with due-process standards and with the protection of survivors, witnesses and the organisations that collected the evidence.

ANNEX 1

The 37 International Organisations Notified of Deregistration



On 30 December 2025 the following 37 international organisations were notified that their registration in Israel would expire on 31 December 2025, triggering a 60-day period after which they would be required to cease operations in Gaza and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem.¹⁸⁵ Fields of activity are as described by the organisations themselves. Entries marked with an asterisk (*) indicate organisations whose documented fields of activity include sexual and reproductive health, maternal health, gender-based violence response or the protection of women and girls; these are discussed in Chapter III.

No.	Organisation	Main field of activity
1	Action Against Hunger	Food security, nutrition, water and sanitation, cash assistance, emergency response
2	ActionAid*	Women's and girls' rights and protection, development, livelihoods, humanitarian assistance, advocacy
3	Alianza por la Solidaridad	Development and humanitarian assistance, protection, food security, civil-society support
4	Campaign for the Children of Palestine	Child support, education, protection, humanitarian assistance
5	CARE International*	Health, food security, water and sanitation, protection, support for women and families
6	DanChurchAid	Humanitarian assistance, explosive-remnants clearance, water and sanitation, livelihoods
7	Danish Refugee Council	Protection of displaced people and refugees, shelter, cash assistance, mine action, livelihoods
8	Humanity & Inclusion – Handicap International	Rehabilitation, disability inclusion, protection, explosive-remnants clearance, mental health
9	Japan International Volunteer Center	Relief, health, water and sanitation, agriculture, community support
10	Médecins du Monde France*	Healthcare, mental health, sexual and reproductive health, support to health facilities

¹⁸⁵ Joint statement of 53 international non-governmental organisations, "Israel's recent registration measures will impede critical humanitarian action", January 2026. <https://www.nrc.no/news/2026/53-international-ngos-warn-israels-recent-registration-measures-will-impede-critical-humanitarian-action>

No.	Organisation	Main field of activity
11	Médecins du Monde Switzerland*	Healthcare, mental health, sexual and reproductive health, emergency response
12	Médecins Sans Frontières Belgium	Medical and surgical care, emergency response, treatment of injuries and illness, hospital support
13	Médecins Sans Frontières France*	Medical and surgical care, emergency response, maternal and child health, hospital support
14	Médecins Sans Frontières Netherlands	Medical care, mental health, emergency services, health-system support
15	Médecins Sans Frontières Spain	Medical care, surgery, emergency response, mental health, support for health workers
16	Médicos del Mundo*	Healthcare, sexual and reproductive health, mental health, support for marginalised groups
17	Mercy Corps	Cash assistance, food security, livelihoods, water and sanitation, youth support
18	Norwegian Refugee Council*	Shelter, education, protection, legal assistance, cash assistance, water and sanitation
19	Oxfam Novib	Water and sanitation, food security, livelihoods, protection, advocacy and rights
20	Première Urgence Internationale	Health, food security, water and sanitation, shelter, psychosocial support
21	Terre des Hommes Lausanne*	Child protection, health, education, psychosocial support, humanitarian response
22	WeWorld–GVC	Education, child protection, water and sanitation, food security, livelihoods
23	International Rescue Committee*	Health, protection of children and women, education, psychosocial support, cash assistance
24	World Vision International	Child protection, education, food security, water and sanitation, psychosocial support
25	Relief International	Healthcare, nutrition, water and sanitation, emergency response, facility support
26	Fondazione AVSI	Education, health, child support, livelihoods, water and sanitation, community development
27	Movement for Peace – MPDL*	Humanitarian assistance, protection, gender equality, livelihoods, peacebuilding
28	American Friends Service Committee	Human rights, community protection, peace, advocacy, civil-society support

No.	Organisation	Main field of activity
29	Medico International	Health, human rights, support for local partners, rehabilitation, advocacy
30	Palestine Solidarity Association in Sweden	Humanitarian support, education, health, solidarity, advocacy
31	Defence for Children International	Children's rights, monitoring and documentation, legal assistance, protection, advocacy
32	Medical Aid for Palestinians – UK*	Healthcare, hospital support, mental health, sexual and reproductive health, medical training
33	Caritas Internationalis	Humanitarian assistance, health, education, protection, social and economic support
34	Caritas Jerusalem*	Health, relief, education, rehabilitation, social services, family support
35	Near East Council of Churches	Healthcare, relief, refugee support, education, social services
36	Oxfam Quebec	Water and sanitation, food security, livelihoods, protection, advocacy
37	War Child Holland*	Child protection, education, mental health, psychosocial support

ANNEX 2

Documented Restrictions on Palestinian Content by Digital Platforms



The table below summarises documentation by 7amleh – the Arab Center for the Advancement of social media. The findings are 7amleh’s; PWWSO reproduces them because the platforms concerned are the principal channels through which Palestinian women’s organisations publish documentation, reach survivors and conduct advocacy, as discussed in Chapter III.

Platform	Documented pattern and evidence
Meta (Facebook, Instagram, Threads, WhatsApp)	7amleh’s <i>Platformicide of Palestine (2021–2025)</i> , produced with Dr Fabio Cristiano of Utrecht University and published on 9 June 2026, analysed 3,520 cases submitted to the 7or observatory over five years. Meta’s “Dangerous Organisations and Individuals” policy was applied to approximately 71 per cent of journalists’ cases and 59 per cent of media-outlet cases in the sample. Meta acknowledged 14 incorrect removals before October 2023, compared with 248 afterwards. ¹⁸⁶ A separate 7amleh report of September 2025 records that Meta employs more than 40,000 content moderators and generated US\$134.9 billion in revenue in 2023, while failing to allocate sufficient resources to the moderation of Hebrew-language incitement; it draws on over 2,000 pieces of harmful content manually detected on Meta’s platforms between October 2023 and May 2025, and on 7amleh’s AI-powered Violence Indicator, which detected more than 2.5 million harmful Hebrew posts in 2024 alone. ¹⁸⁷ A 2026 follow-up found that Israeli far-right and settler-affiliated pages were able to earn advertising revenue, while Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza remained excluded from monetisation eligibility on the basis of geographic location. ¹⁸⁸
LinkedIn / Microsoft	7amleh’s report of 27 October 2025 drew on 15 user testimonies and on interviews with LinkedIn and Microsoft employees, and described a working environment characterised by institutional bias and anti-Palestinian racism, including the repeated removal of posts containing particular political phrases. ¹⁸⁹
YouTube / Google	According to 7amleh’s <i>Hashtag Palestine 2025</i> , sustained government pressure on United States technology companies preceded YouTube’s permanent removal of the channels of three Palestinian human-rights organisations — Al-Haq, Al-Mezan and the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights — deleting more than 700 videos documenting alleged war crimes. ¹⁹⁰

¹⁸⁶ 7amleh – The Arab Center for the Advancement of Social Media, with Dr Fabio Cristiano (Utrecht University), *The Platformicide of Palestine (2021–2025): A Data-Based Analysis of Meta’s Policy Application, Moderation Enforcement, and Communication*, 9 June 2026. <https://7amleh.org/post/meta-suppression-of-palestinian-content-en>

¹⁸⁷ 7amleh – The Arab Center for the Advancement of Social Media, *Meta’s Role in Amplifying Harmful Content During Genocide in Gaza*, 2 September 2025. <https://7amleh.org/post/meta-s-role-during-genocide-en>

¹⁸⁸ 7amleh – The Arab Center for the Advancement of Social Media, *Monetising Occupation: Meta’s Financial Enablement of Settlement Activity and Violent Rhetoric Against Palestinians*, 13 April 2026. <https://7amleh.org/post/meta-monetizes-settlements-and-violence-en>

¹⁸⁹ 7amleh – The Arab Center for the Advancement of Social Media, *Digital Rights Under Threat: The Impact of LinkedIn’s Biased Moderation Amid Genocide*, 27 October 2025. <https://7amleh.org/post/digital-rights-under-threat-en>

¹⁹⁰ 7amleh – The Arab Center for the Advancement of Social Media, *Hashtag Palestine 2025: Digital Repression as a System Governed by Law, Political Pressure, and Algorithms*, annual report, 18 February 2026. <https://7amleh.org/post/hashtag-palestine-2025-en>

Platform	Documented pattern and evidence
X (formerly Twitter)	7amleh's <i>Racism and Incitement Index 2024</i> found that X hosted the largest share of documented violent or inciting content against Palestinians — 79 per cent — despite Facebook having a larger Israeli user base. ¹⁹¹ A separate 7amleh position paper found comparatively less account restriction or de-platforming of Palestinian users on X than on other platforms; its principal concern regarding X was the platform's tolerance of incitement rather than the suppression of Palestinian content. ¹⁹²
TikTok	A 2026 7amleh study examined how TikTok's recommendation algorithm interacts with and reproduces harmful social narratives within Palestinian communities in Israel. Of 1,038 posts examined, 312 (28.8 per cent) centred on the construction of a "criminal identity" associated with prestige, power and reputation linked to organised crime; together these posts received more than 29 million views. 7amleh concluded that the recommendation system can amplify such material and, in numerous cases, functions as a space used by organised-crime networks to reproduce violence. ¹⁹³
Fundraising and freelance platforms	<i>Hashtag Palestine 2025</i> documents blocked or frozen humanitarian fundraisers connected to Gaza, and records that freelance platforms penalised Gaza-based workers, with 86 per cent of surveyed freelancers facing reputational or contractual penalties for connectivity failures outside their control. ¹⁹⁴
Cross-platform baseline	7amleh's report of 16 September 2024 documented more than 15,000 cases of digital censorship and of the spread of harmful content on major platforms between October 2023 and September 2024. Transparency was absent in nearly 70 per cent of cases, in which users were not informed which policy they had allegedly violated. Approximately half of the 2,800 appeals submitted by 7amleh between 2021 and 2025 received no response. ¹⁹⁵ During 2025 alone, 7amleh documented 3,452 digital rights violations, including 538 platform-censorship complaints and 2,910 documented cases of hate speech and incitement. ¹⁹⁶

¹⁹¹ 7amleh – The Arab Center for the Advancement of Social Media, *Racism and Incitement Index 2024*, 12 March 2025. <https://7amleh.org/post/racism-index-2024-en>

¹⁹² 7amleh – The Arab Center for the Advancement of Social Media, position paper, *The Impact of X Platform's Content Moderation Policies on Palestinian Digital Rights*, 14 March 2024. <https://7amleh.org/post/new-position-paper-highlights-impacts-of-x-platform-s-content-moderation-policies-on-palestinian-digital-rights>

¹⁹³ 7amleh – The Arab Center for the Advancement of Social Media, *Algorithms of Violence: Analysis of Behaviours, Representations, and Implications of Organised Crime on TikTok among Palestinian Society in Israel*, 2026. <https://7amleh.org/storage/posts/pdf/ed672c03-2ee2-40b2-9f92-b47756c48a76.pdf>

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¹⁹⁵ 7amleh – The Arab Center for the Advancement of Social Media, *Palestinian Digital Rights, Genocide, and Big Tech Accountability*, 16 September 2024. <https://7amleh.org/post/report-on-palestinian-digital-rights-in-the-context-of-genocide-and-big-tech-accountability-one-year-after-the-war-on-gaza-en>

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Palestinian Working Woman Society for Development

PWWSD is a Palestinian feminist civil-society organisation working for the protection and empowerment of Palestinian women and girls, and for accountability for violations of their rights.

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